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A B S T R A C T
We investigate the impact of land use regulation on housing vacancy rates. Using a 30-year panel dataset on land
use regulation for 350 English Local Authorities (LAs) and addressing potential reverse causation and other
endogeneity concerns, we ﬁnd that tighter local planning constraints increase local housing vacancy rates: a one
standard deviation increase in restrictiveness causes the local vacancy rate to increase by 0.9 percentage points
(23%). The same increase in local restrictiveness also causes a 6.1% rise in commuting distances. The results
underline the interdependence of local housing and Labour markets and the unintended adverse impact of more
restrictive planning policies.
1. Introduction
To an economist it might seem self-evident that vacancies in the
housing stock are a natural feature of how any market must work. There
even are ‘uneaten’ apples in a well-functioning fruit market. The Labour
market is very much more comparable to the housing market and vir-
tually all mainstream economists expect to observe at least frictional
unemployment when the Labour market is in equilibrium (see
Pissarides, 1985; Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994; Pissarides, 1994). It
is the same in any normally functioning housing market. In equilibrium
there must be vacant houses as people move and ‘house-hunt’, as people
die or houses wait to be demolished and sellers wait to ﬁnd a buyer
(Han and Strange, 2015).
But this view is often not shared by those who design buildings and
inﬂuence urban policy or with those who plan housing supply – at least
in England. Even in what was then one of the least restrictive English
Regions, the East Midlands, in calculating how much land should be
allocated for housing to meet their estimate of their region's ‘housing
needs’, planners argued that they could allocate less land because they
assumed they would reduce the number of vacant homes:
‘The annual average housing provision reﬂects a number of factors,
transactional vacancies in new stock (about 2%) add 7,000 to the re-
quirement, but oﬀset against that is an assumption that vacancies in the
existing stock should be reduced by a half per-cent, which will bring
8,600 dwellings back into use.’ (Government Oﬃce for the East
Midlands, 2005, Appendix 4, p. 91).
It is surely true that using ones stock of capital more intensively is a
way of increasing eﬃciency. That is just how cut price airlines operate:
they keep their seats full and their aircraft in the air. They, however,
had an analysis of how to achieve this. They did not just assume planes
would spend more of their lives in the air and seats would be fuller.
Unless we understand why houses are vacant we cannot rationally hope
to reduce the number of vacant houses just by being more restrictive.
To help improve our understanding of the factors which determine
vacancy rates in the housing market, this paper investigates the causal,
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albeit reduced-form, impact of regulatory restrictiveness. Moreover,
since housing and Labour markets are interdependent, we also in-
vestigate the related issue of how local regulatory restrictiveness aﬀects
the average commute distance of those working in the jurisdiction.
These are not the only outcomes of greater regulatory restrictiveness.
We ﬁnd that there are other measurable eﬀects apart from raised house
prices, all apparently responses to poorer housing market matching
(discussed below); more households are in temporary homes, crowding
is greater, and in-migration lower.
These results stem from the insight that policy imposed restrictions
on housing supply may have two opposing eﬀects.1 The ﬁrst of these we
call the ‘opportunity cost eﬀect’. Tighter restrictions on supply imply
fewer available houses and therefore more demand pressure for existing
homes, increasing house prices and thus the opportunity cost of keeping
housing empty. This will lead to a lower vacancy rate all else equal. If
this ‘opportunity cost eﬀect’ was the only eﬀect at work, tighter supply
constraints should unambiguously lower vacancy rates.
There is however a second eﬀect, which we refer to as the ‘mismatch
eﬀect’. Tighter supply constraints not only reduce supply of new houses
but also inﬂuence the composition and adaptability of the bundle of
attributes of both the existing housing stock and those of new built
homes. Over time the structure of households' demand for housing at-
tributes changes because incomes rise, the demographic structure of the
population changes and preferences themselves may change. For ex-
ample, as real incomes rise, so does the demand for certain attributes
depending on the varying income elasticity of demand for them.2 In
addition there may be demographic changes such as an increase in the
proportion of single adults, which mean that market preferences
change.
If the attributes of the housing stock, as a consequence of planning
constraints, cannot, or can only more slowly adjust to these changes on
the demand side, matching the demand for housing attributes with the
supply of those available will inevitably become more diﬃcult. Hence,
in line with Wheaton (1990), mismatched households may have to stay
longer in a less restrictive housing market while searching in a more
restrictive one, implying a relatively lower vacancy rate in the less re-
strictive market and a higher vacancy rate in the more restrictive one.
Mismatched households may also take temporary accommodation and
search for longer in more restrictive markets or have to search further
aﬁeld for a suitable home; they become mismatched on the locational
characteristics of houses implying longer commutes.
Our aim in this paper is to determine the net eﬀect of these two
opposing forces – the opportunity cost eﬀect versus the mismatch eﬀect
– in order to identify the role that regulatory restrictiveness plays in
determining the vacancy rate in local housing markets. To do so, we
analyse panel data on housing vacancies from 1981 to 2011 for 350
English Local Authorities (LAs), the basic local jurisdictional unit that
implements planning policies and approves or rejects individual plan-
ning applications. One key concern in this analysis is the endogeneity of
local planning restrictiveness. The stylised fact that policy makers and
local planners may respond to higher vacancy rates by restricting
supply suggests possible reverse causation. Regulatory constraints may
also be endogenous to unobserved demand factors (Hilber and Robert-
Nicoud, 2013; Davidoﬀ, 2016) and those demand factors may directly
aﬀect vacancy rates. To account for possible reverse causation and
omitted variable bias and thus identify the causal eﬀect of regulatory
restrictiveness, we employ an instrumental variable strategy by ex-
ploiting speciﬁc features of the British voting system which induces a
substantial ‘randomness’ of seats won (or lost) beyond the vote share.
That is, we use the share of Labour seats in LAs, controlling for the share
of Labour votes in a ﬂexible way, as an instrumental variable to identify
local planning restrictiveness. One could query this identiﬁcation
strategy because, for example, the political composition of an LA could
inﬂuence local government expenditures and those, in turn, might in-
ﬂuence house prices and vacancy rates. Based on a series of placebo
regressions, we show that these alternative explanations do not plau-
sibly invalidate the main conclusions.
Our two key empirical ﬁndings are as follows. First, when we na-
ively look at cross-sectional data, we ﬁnd a negative relationship be-
tween more restrictive local planning and local vacancy rates, super-
ﬁcially appearing to conﬁrm “planners' assumptions”. However, when
we (i) use ﬁrst diﬀerencing and so control for time-invariant un-
observable characteristics, (ii) properly account for the endogeneity of
restrictiveness by instrumenting for it and (iii) control for other relevant
factors, more restrictive places have a signiﬁcantly – and substantially –
higher vacancy rate. That is, the underlying causal relationship appears
to be exactly the opposite to that which planners assume. Based on our
most rigorous empirical speciﬁcation, a one standard deviation increase
in local regulatory restrictiveness causes the average local vacancy rate
to increase by about 0.9 percentage points (23%).
Second, we ﬁnd that regulation-induced mismatch has spatial im-
plications for Labour markets. Workers with jobs in LAs with more
restrictive planning have to search for housing they can aﬀord and
match their preferences further aﬁeld; so they are more likely to be
locationally mismatched and have to commute further. Using a similar
approach to that used for investigating the underlying relationship
between the vacancy rate and restrictiveness we ﬁnd that a one stan-
dard deviation increase in local regulatory restrictiveness causes an
increase in average commuting distance of some 6.1%. We also provide
additional suggestive evidence relating to other proxies for mismatch,
such as the share of crowded or non-permanent properties and the share
of migrants.
Our ﬁndings, therefore, strongly suggest that tighter local planning
restrictiveness not only leads to less eﬃcient housing market matching
but also this eﬀect dominates the opportunity cost eﬀect, resulting in
higher local vacancy rates overall and longer average commutes.
Hence, local eﬀorts to reduce the number of vacant homes by imposing
supply restrictions have three unintended eﬀects: they increase the
local vacancy rate and they increase the average commuting distance of
those who work in the jurisdiction – thereby causing a welfare cost. In
addition, as the literature shows, they increase local house prices (see
e.g. Cheshire and Sheppard, 2002; Glaeser and Gyourko, 2003; Hilber
and Vermeulen, 2016).
We proceed as follows. In the next section we discuss in more depth
the link between land use regulation and mismatch in the housing
market and how that aﬀects the local vacancy rate and the average
commuting distance. We then describe our data and set out our main
results. The ﬁnal section draws conclusions.
2. Land use regulation, housing market search and vacant housing
The price of housing services is a function of both demand and
supply in the relevant local markets. Various empirical studies docu-
ment a positive eﬀect of regulatory restrictiveness on house prices
(Cheshire and Sheppard, 2002; Glaeser and Gyourko, 2003; Glaeser
et al., 2005a, 2005b; Quigley and Raphael, 2005; Ihlanfeldt, 2007;
Hilber and Vermeulen, 2016).
What these studies do not consider is the fact that, on the seller's
side, it takes time to sell a house and, on the buyer's side, search for a
new house is costly too. These search frictions lead to housing vacancies
(Merlo and Ortalo-Magné, 2004; Han and Strange, 2015). It has been
documented – and our data also suggest – that housing vacancies are
1 Regulation may have more than two eﬀects. We discuss one potential additional
mechanism – a real options argument – in Section 3.7. If greater restrictiveness led to
greater price volatility then under certain assumptions this might induce owners to
postpone renting or selling their properties, implying a higher vacancy rate (Grenadier,
1995, 1996). Empirically, however, we can ﬁnd no evidence that such a mechanism plays
a signiﬁcant part in explaining what we ﬁnd. Other mechanisms are also discussed in that
section.
2 The income elasticity of demand for space both inside houses and in gardens seems to
be particularly strong: Cheshire and Sheppard (1998) estimate an elasticity of close to
two.
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not constant across space and time and depend on the characteristics
and preferences of households living in a housing market, as well as on
those of the location such as characteristics that are systematic of
persistently weak housing demand (Rosen and Smith, 1983; Gabriel and
Nothaft, 1988; Gabriel and Nothaft, 2001; Deng et al., 2003; Molloy,
2016). However, the impact of land use restrictions on housing va-
cancies has not yet been studied.
In the context of this paper we use data on local jurisdictions – in
Britain, LAs – which we refer to as local housing markets.3 On the de-
mand side, households often search in a local housing market while still
living in another local market, for example due to changes in where
they work (Mulalic et al., 2014; Koster and Van Ommeren, 2017). On
the supply side, the characteristics of housing are the result of both the
characteristics of new build housing and the adaptation of the char-
acteristics of the existing stock.
The degree of regulatory restrictiveness inﬂuences the character-
istics of new construction and of the existing stock in very great detail.
Both new construction and signiﬁcant changes to the characteristics of
existing houses – converting loft to living space, for example – likely
require ‘development control’ permission. This is the responsibility of
the LA's Planning Committee made up of locally elected politicians. This
decision making process tends to be politicised and unlike a Zoning or
Master Planning system, such as in force in the US or in most of
Continental Europe, decisions are not very predictable.
As noted in the introduction, planning induced housing supply re-
strictions will have two opposing eﬀects on the housing vacancy rate:
an ‘opportunity cost eﬀect’ and a ‘mismatch eﬀect’. The opportunity
cost eﬀect works via restrictions of supply reducing the availability of
land for development (see for example Cheshire and Sheppard, 2005, or
Hilber and Vermeulen, 2016). This reduces the rate of new building and
so over time the size of the stock of housing relative to demand within
the market. This, all else equal, increases prices and thus the opportu-
nity cost of keeping housing vacant. The eﬀect of this is unambiguously
to reduce vacancy rates. It will also be likely to increase price volatility.
However, more restrictive planning policies will also change the
bundle of attributes on oﬀer and, other things equal, slow the rate of
adaptation of housing characteristics to changes in the structure of
demand with respect to them – the mismatch eﬀect. The latter eﬀect is
expected to increase vacancy rates. This will come about via two se-
parate forces, one working on the characteristics of new build and the
other on the adaptation of the characteristics of the existing stock of
houses.
The ﬁrst force may imply that new build houses become smaller,
more distant from jobs and are more likely to be in the form of ﬂats or
terraced houses, because there is less land available for dwellings. The
second force arises because the structure of demand for housing char-
acteristics changes over time and to accommodate this, the character-
istics of the existing stock of housing need to be constantly adjusted. For
example, entry to the best state schools in Britain is determined by the
exact location of houses. As the relative standing of diﬀerent schools
changes over time, people seeking to ‘buy’ entry to better state schools
will want more bedroom space in the best schools' catchment areas.
However, the more restrictive is the LA, the more diﬃcult it will be to
adapt existing houses to provide more space or for developers to build
additional family housing near better schools.
Another example is that as more cars have been bought (car own-
ership has increased 13-fold since the current form of land use planning
in England was introduced in 1947 and doubled since our vacancy data
starts in 1981, Department of Transport, 2013), the demand for garages
and oﬀ street parking has increased. Such examples of ways in which
the demand for housing attributes changes over time could be increased
almost indeﬁnitely. However, what it means is that if the supply and
demand for the structural characteristics of housing are to be eﬃciently
matched to each other, there will need to be constant adaptation of the
characteristics of the existing stock of houses. So more restrictive LAs
will slow the adaptation of the existing stock to (changes in) the
structure of demand for housing attributes.
Over time, in more restrictive LAs the characteristics of new and
existing housing available will be less adapted to preferences of
households. Hence, other things equal, if people have a (strong) idio-
syncratic preference for locations and house type (e.g. a double-earner
household with children that needs at least two-bedrooms and garden
space), they will spend more time searching for housing that matches
their preferences. When households live in a less restrictive housing
market while searching in the more restrictive local market, this will
imply a decrease in the vacancy rate in the former and an increase in
the latter housing market.4 In other words, given idiosyncratic pre-
ferences, households stay longer in the ‘wrong’ places.
This may imply that younger people live longer with their parents in
‘crowded’ properties, or that households are induced to stay in tem-
porary accommodation while searching. Because the housing stock does
not match their current preferences, this implies a higher vacancy rate,
other things equal, in the more restrictive housing market. We provide
some evidence on some of these diﬀerent symptoms of mismatch in
Section 3.6 where we look at how regulation inﬂuences the share of
non-permanent homes and ‘crowded’ properties.
We discuss also a more obvious measure of mismatch in Section 3.4:
commuting distances from the workplace in the LA. We do indeed ﬁnd
that for workers in more restrictive LAs commuting distances increase
signiﬁcantly. This result is consistent with house hunters ﬁnding it more
diﬃcult to match their preferences in more restrictive local housing
markets so becoming ‘mismatched’ locationally. This has interesting
implications for the boundaries of local Labour markets – they appear to
be determined not just by transport costs but also by local planning
policies – and how these aﬀect the total supply of housing and the
supply of individual housing characteristics. Because households may
decide not to move to the desired more restricted place, the share of in-
migrants is expected to be lower in the more restrictive housing market.
We provide evidence for the latter in Section 3.6.
The well-documented fact that tighter local regulation leads to
higher prices is indicative that the opportunity cost eﬀect may be im-
portant in determining local vacancy rates. However, we lack evidence
on the importance of the oﬀsetting mismatch eﬀect. Thus the net eﬀect
of local regulatory restrictiveness on local vacancy rates is ambiguous.
The empirical analysis that follows aims to identify this net eﬀect while
eliminating alternative explanations.
One may question whether changes in vacancy rates are a suﬃcient
statistic when one is interested in the welfare eﬀects of land use reg-
ulation. We do not argue that vacancy rates in general are a suﬃcient
statistic. However, when one is speciﬁcally interested in the change in
welfare due to an increase in mismatch caused by more restrictive local
planning, an increase in the vacancy rate (beyond the natural rate) is a
suﬃcient statistic for the former.
In line with a large Labour market literature on matching, and as
demonstrated by Koster and Van Ommeren (2017), from a welfare
perspective housing search may be either too low or too high. However,
3 It might be argued that Travel to Work Areas (TTWA) approximate more closely to
spatial housing markets but as our results demonstrate, the geographical extent of both
housing and Labour markets is jointly determined. Planning policy is implemented by the
local jurisdiction, the LA, so it is only by using these as our units of analysis that the
relationship between restrictiveness and commuting distances can be revealed. Not only
do TTWAs not correspond to any political jurisdiction but our ﬁnding on the impact of
planning restrictiveness on distance commuted shows their boundaries are partially de-
termined by the policy actions of their constituent jurisdictions.
4 In the Web Appendix we demonstrate this in a standard search model setting,
building on the seminal paper by Wheaton (1990). Using numerical simulations, we
formally demonstrate that under realistic parameter assumptions an increase in the (re-
lative) regulatory restrictiveness in a particular market increases the local vacancy rate in
that market (and lowers it in the comparably less restrictive market), even with perfectly
inelastic total demand for housing.
P. Cheshire et al. Journal of Public Economics 158 (2018) 126–151
128
when search is too low, that is caused by an externality for sellers: if
buyers search more they will ﬁnd a suitable property sooner, thereby
reducing the time on the market and the associated costs for the seller.
Buyers do not take this into account when increasing search eﬀort.
However, a regulation-induced increase in vacancy rates while in-
creasing search eﬀort, neither reduces sales times, nor increases
matching quality, so the welfare eﬀects are unambiguously negative.
This is important because planning policies that aim to reduce va-
cancies by reducing new construction but end up leaving more houses
empty, cause an under-utilisation of a major capital asset. According to
ONS by the end of 2013 houses accounted for 61% of the UK's net
worth: up from 48.7% 20 years previously (ONS, 2016). So the capital
stock represented by housing is very signiﬁcant indeed and so its un-
derutilisation represents a signiﬁcant economic ineﬃciency.
The eﬀects on commuting are important in their own right as again
they represent a welfare loss resulting from increased diﬃculty of
matching.
Of course planning policies per se have the potential to increase
social welfare via correcting market failures and we are not claiming
here that our evidence on the eﬀect of land use regulation on vacancy
rates and commuting distances in isolation suggests that local planning
restrictions reduce net welfare. However, there is evidence at least for
the UK and the US that an increase in the restrictiveness of planning
policy (from current levels) has a net negative eﬀect on welfare (see
Cheshire and Sheppard, 2002 for the UK and Turner et al. (2014) for the
US). In this context, our ﬁnding that more restrictive local planning
increases the local vacancy rate and commuting distance via raising
mismatch in the local housing market, adds to the alleged net negative
eﬀect on welfare. Both eﬀects (on vacancy rates and commuting dis-
tances) have been ignored in the literature so far.
3. Empirical analysis
3.1. Data and descriptive statistics
Our data come from several sources. The vacancy rates are from the
UK Census for the years 1981, 1991, 2001 and 2011.5 For the ﬁrst three
Census years we have information on the number of vacant dwellings
and we are able to distinguish between primary dwellings and second
homes.6 The 2011 Census reported only information on the number of
unoccupied dwellings including second homes. To estimate vacancies for
2011 in the most consistent way possible, therefore, we assume that the
share of second homes remained constant between 2001 and 2011. In a
robustness check we use an alternative dataset for vacancy rates
(available for 2001 and 2011 only) to test whether our ﬁndings are
sensitive to this adjustment. The latter dataset is provided by the De-
partment of Communities and Local Government (DCLG) using the LA
returns for the Council Tax.7
Our measures of regulatory restrictiveness come from the DCLG's
Planning Statistics. Following the literature, our key measure is the
refusal rate for major residential projects available for each LA on an
annual basis. The refusal rate for ‘major’ projects is deﬁned as the share
of applications for residential developments of ten or more dwellings
that is refused by an LA in any year during the process of ‘development
control’. We calculate this for each LA using data on all applications and
refused applications of major developments for the Census year itself
plus the two years preceding it.8 In what follows we call this variable
the refusal rate.
As a proxy for local (housing) demand we use LA-level male weekly
earnings for the period from 1981 to 2011. Our earnings data come
from the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) for 2001 and
2011 and from the New Earnings Survey (NES) for 1981 and 1991. We
obtained the ASHE data at the LA-level but the NES data for earlier
years are only available at the county and London borough level. We
then geographically matched all earnings data to the LA-level and de-
ﬂated the nominal earnings ﬁgures by the Retail Price Index to obtain
real earnings. For more details on the data and procedures used, see
Hilber and Vermeulen (2016).
A number of other factors may inﬂuence vacancy rates, in particular
housing tenure, demographics and socio economic characteristics. We
obtain these control variables from the Population Censuses. Our list of
controls includes the local homeownership rate. Homeowners tend to
move less often than renters, and this is likely to be reﬂected in higher
vacancy rates for rental housing. We also control for the share of
council housing. Because rents of council houses are usually below
market value, there are waiting lists for them. This is likely to imply a
shorter duration of vacancies (Pawson and Kintrea, 2002). However,
this eﬀect could be oﬀset to the extent councils have less eﬃcient
housing management.
The Population Censuses also provide data on the share of people
between 30 and 64 and the share of elderly, 65 and over. Young people
may be more ﬂexible in their housing choices than older people, and
they may be less selective because they are more income constrained or
have lower search costs (perhaps because of lower opportunity costs of
time) leading to lower vacancy rates in LAs where there are pro-
portionately more young adults. On the other hand, younger people
tend to have a higher mobility rate, leading to higher vacancy rates. The
mortality rate is of course highly correlated to the share of elderly.
Death frequently implies that houses become vacant and, moreover,
because of probate and perhaps other reasons (the new owner may not
be a local resident or the house has suﬀered a period of neglect so is
more likely to need refurbishment) houses that become vacant on the
death of their owner are likely to remain vacant for longer. Other
control variables derived from the Population Censuses are the share
unemployed, the share of highly educated, and the share of residents
with permanent illnesses.
As a proxy for mismatch and as a signiﬁcant focus of interest in its
own right, we gather data on the average commuting distance from the
workplace for all the Census years. The data provide us with the share
of people per commuting distance band (0–2 km, 2–5 km, etc.). We
then calculate the average commuting distance by taking the midpoint
of each category and weighting it by the number of persons in each
category. We further gather data on other variables that may relate to
spatial mismatch from the Census, such as the share of crowded prop-
erties, the share of shared properties, the share of migrants and the
share of non-permanent dwellings.
Our instrumental variable strategy employs information on the po-
litical composition of the LA and local vote shares. We obtained the
local election data from various sources: (i) the British Local Election
Database (1889–2003) compiled by Rallings and Thrasher (2004), (ii)
5 The Census does not distinguish between short-term and long-term vacant housing
units. Molloy (2016) points out that in the United States, long-term vacancies are on
average rare but there are substantial spatial diﬀerences. Our data do not allow us to
explore diﬀerences between short-term and long-term vacancies. However, it is worth
pointing out that due to the extremely inﬂexible planning system in England, over-
building is highly unlikely anywhere in the country. Long-term vacancies as a con-
sequence of weak housing demand will likely be concentrated in the north of the country
and the change in the unemployment rate will likely capture the eﬀect of declining areas
in our empirical analysis.
6 The Census uses the term ‘household space’, which is a space taken by one household,
including that of just one person. Almost no household shares facilities like bathrooms
(< 0.1%), implying that the number of (vacant) household spaces is essentially the same
as the number of (vacant) dwellings. Hence, in what follows, we will refer to dwellings as
household spaces.
7 The cross-sectional correlation between the 2001 Census and the DCLG data is 0.68,
indicating that there are non-trivial diﬀerences in the measurement of vacant dwellings
arising from the diﬀerent methodologies. As is discussed later, this hardly aﬀects our
results however.
8 In a sensitivity analysis – see Appendix 2 – we also use additional information on the
refusal rate of minor projects and show that our results are robust when we include this
additional information.
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the Local Election Handbooks (1999 to 2008), (iii) the Local Elections
Archive Project (LEAP) (2006 to 2010) and (iv) the BBC (2009 to 2011).
We do not have data on four LAs, so these are excluded from the ana-
lysis, leaving us with a sample of 350 LAs and four Census years (1981,
1991, 2001 and 2011).9 Since it might be argued that turnout is un-
representatively low at local elections in the sensitivity analysis, we
also use data on general elections, by matching each Census year to the
nearest general election year (i.e., 1983, 1992, 2001 and 2010). The LA-
level share of votes for the Labour party in the general elections is
derived from the British Election Studies Information System. For more
information on the election data, see Appendix 1.
We also gather data on net local expenditures from the Chartered
Institute for Public Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA) annual reports on
ﬁnance and general estimates available for each LA. We choose
spending categories that remain robust over time, such as spending on
education, personal and social services (such as social care), highways,
housing services, local planning and the total local net expenditures.
Because these are net expenditures, they may be negative in certain
instances. We express the local expenditures in £ per head of the po-
pulation. We note that for education, personal and social services, and
highways, the largest share of the spending is done at the county level.
Although LAs have some freedom to spend extra money, we add the net
spending per head at the county level to the local expenditures in these
categories (otherwise most values would be zero). This also explains
why the total local expenditures of an LA are lower than, for example,
the net spending on education: the total expenditures only refer to
expenditures by the LA itself. In a few instances data are missing for
individual LAs (in particular for a dozen LAs in Greater London in
1981). In cases such as this we impute the missing values from the
average spending in a county, implying (a small) measurement error.
However, in the placebo regressions in Section 3.4 the spending is the
dependent variable. As long as this measurement error is random, it
does not aﬀect the estimated coeﬃcients.
We obtained data on house prices from the Land Registry
(1995–2011) and the Council of Mortgage Lenders (CML) (1974–1995).
We do so by taking account of the composition of sales in terms of
housing types by adopting a mix-adjustment approach (see Wall, 1998).
The real price index is obtained by again deﬂating the nominal series
with the Retail Price Index. We then use the price index to create a
measure of local price volatility; for more information see Hilber and
Vermeulen (2016).
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics. The average overall va-
cancy rate is about 4%. The vacancy rate in 2011 was 3.6%. This is only
slightly lower than in the United States, where it was 4.5% in 2012.
This might seem surprising when one takes into account the enormous
excess supply of housing in the wake of the Great Recession that made
housing extremely aﬀordable in the US. In Fig. 1 we plot the cross-
sectional relationship between the vacancy rate and house prices. Va-
cancy rates are somewhat lower in areas with high prices
(ρ=−0.246), consistent with the opportunity cost argument discussed
above. There is little response to the housing market cycle; the corre-
lation between the change in the vacancy rate and the change in house
prices is very low with ρ=−0.069.
We map the average local vacancy rates over the sample period in
Fig. 2. There is meaningful variation in vacancy rates over space. They
are generally higher in the less prosperous north. Cities like Liverpool
and Bradford, which respectively relied on traditional port and port-
related manufacturing or textiles, experienced decline from the 1950s.
Apart from high unemployment and lower earnings there was outward
migration tending to generate a more obsolete housing stock and higher
housing vacancy rates. Also in areas where mining was historically
important (in County Durham and Lancashire for example), vacancy
rates tend to be higher. We implicitly control for these geographical
diﬀerences in the industry composition by ﬁrst diﬀerencing our em-
pirical speciﬁcation, thus capturing all time-invariant characteristics
that vary over space. The inclusion of the ﬁrst diﬀerence in the local
unemployment rate as a further control should eﬀectively control for
any relevant inﬂuence of changes in industrial structure on housing
vacancy rates.
Refusal rates over the last 30 years have been clearly highest in the
Greater London Area and in the south of England and lowest in the
north of the country (Fig. 3). The south of England has not only been
economically considerably more successful than northern regions over
the period, but it has (perhaps relatedly) had much tighter planning
restrictiveness. This – despite strong housing demand – has constrained
the growth of housing supply in southern England relative to the north.
Table 1
Descriptive statistics (repeated cross-section).
Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Vacancy rate (in %) 3.886 1.340 0 12.06
Refusal rate, t-2 (in %) 27.43 14.63 0 78.57
House price (in £) 141,665 91,729 43,804 1.277e + 06
Male weekly earnings (in £) 545.7 147.3 258.3 1793
Share owner-occupied housing
(in %)
66.86 11.22 4.611 89.52
Share council housing (in %) 16.09 11.34 0.416 81.96
Share age 30–65 (in %) 44.87 2.783 36.42 51.62
Share age > 65 (in %) 16.42 3.642 6.128 31.36
Share unemployed (in %) 6.516 2.960 2.042 22.40
Share highly educated (in %) 13.74 11.39 0.244 53.57
Share permanent illness (in %) 3.478 1.878 0.745 12.15
Predicted employment (‘Bartik
instrument’)a
57,913 47,674 9832 474,473
Share Labour seats, t-2, (in %) 30.87 26.86 0 99.17
Share Labour voters, local
elections (in %)
31.49 16.76 0 76.95
Share Labour voters, general
election (in %)
29.53 15.21 2.426 75.25
Mean commuting distance from
workplace (in km)
6.853 3.465 2.141 18.66
Share crowded properties (in %) 1.952 1.567 0.399 14.99
Share non-permanent properties
(in %)
57.23 59.05 0.670 586.2
Share migrants (in %) 10.84 3.328 0.466 36.51
Coeﬃcient of variation house
prices, t + 3
0.104 0.0745 0.00755 0.460
Coeﬃcient of variation earnings,
t + 3
0.0755 0.0400 0.00685 0.674
Room diversity 4.589 0.419 3.496 6.259
Unitary authority 0.123 0.328 0 1
Net expenditures on education (in
£ per head)
436.9 278.0 17.67 1643
Net expenditures on social
services (in £ per head)
169.4 147.9 17.32 741.8
Net expenditures on highways (in
£ per head)
38.96 18.99 −72.89 119.2
Net local expenditures on housing
services (in £ per head)
12.81 24.02 −3.605 210.2
Net local expenditures on
planning (in £ per head)
12.15 16.16 −29.26 308.1
Total local net expenditures (in £
per head)
373.0 554.6 15.04 3054
Notes: The number of observations is 1400, as we have 4 observations for 350 local
authorities. t-2 denotes that we include applications up to two years preceding and in-
cluding the year of observation, t + 4 denotes that we include data up to four years after
and including the year of observation.
a Measure is based on 1971 local industry composition.
9 Since in our empirical analysis we ﬁrst diﬀerence the Census data to account for time-
invariant unobservable characteristics, we end up with 350 × (4− 1) = 1050 observa-
tions. We note that some LAs have been amalgamated in 2011, reducing the total number
of LAs to 326. To achieve consistency in our analysis over time we geographically match
the 2011 LA information to 2001 LA boundaries with the help of oﬃcial ‘lookup tables’.
In a robustness check we exclude those LAs that were aﬀected by amalgamation. Results
are very similar.
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3.2. Econometric framework and identiﬁcation
We aim to test the impact of housing supply restrictions (as captured
by the refusal rates of major projects) on vacancy rates. Let vℓ,t be the
vacancy rate in LA ℓ in year t. rℓ,t − 2 is the refusal rate, where the
refusal rate is calculated using all applications and refused applications
in years t− 2, t− 1 and t. We use data up to two years before and
including the year of observation to avoid random yearly ﬂuctuations
and because some LAs receive no or very few applications in a parti-
cular year.10 θt are year ﬁxed eﬀects that capture any aggregate eco-
nomic shocks and also any policy changes at the national level that
might aﬀect vacancy rates. Then:
= + +−v αr θ ϵ ,t t t tℓ, ℓ, 2 ℓ, (1)
where α is the parameter of interest and ϵℓ,t is an independently and
identically distributed error term. Policy makers expect that α < 0,
implying that supply restrictions lead to a lower vacancy rate. The
problem with estimating this speciﬁcation using OLS is that there are
potentially important endogeneity concerns with respect to rℓ,t. First,
there may be several omitted variables that have a joint impact on
regulation and vacancy rates. For example, areas with more demand
(higher earnings) likely have lower vacancy rates and more stringent
planning (Hilber and Robert-Nicoud, 2013). Another concern is that
due to durable housing, the north of England with its declining in-
dustries can be expected to have higher (long-term) vacancy rates
(Molloy, 2016). It is also observed that these areas are less restrictive,
so there may be spurious correlation. This may lead to a (strong)
downward bias of the estimated coeﬃcient α. A second source of bias is
that if developers know that a particular LA is more restrictive and so
more likely to reject applications, they will be less likely to apply in the
ﬁrst place because applications cost signiﬁcant resources. At some limit,
one might argue, the refusal rate could become completely unin-
formative. Developers may know how many (few) projects will be ac-
cepted in any given LA and year. If this is costly, they will be strategic in
the way they play this lottery—at some extreme margin, refusal rates
may be equalised in equilibrium although the payoﬀ from success
would be likely to also rise with the refusal rate. It is important to note
that this point will likely be only a theoretical and not an observed
equilibrium.11 Nevertheless, these considerations imply a measurement
error in the regulatory restrictiveness measure. A third concern is that
vacancy rates also inﬂuence regulatory restrictiveness (reverse caus-
ality). When policy makers observe a high vacancy rate, they may be-
come more reluctant to permit new development.
To partially address the ﬁrst source of endogeneity, we estimate a
ﬁrst-diﬀerence equation, so that we can control for all time-invariant
unobserved factors. Hence:
= + +−v α r θΔ Δ Δϵ ,t t t tℓ, ℓ, 2 ℓ, (2)
where Δ denotes the change.12
This speciﬁcation only partly addresses the ﬁrst endogeneity con-
cern because there might still be correlation with unobserved shocks.
For example, in locations with increasing demand, house prices and
regulatory restrictiveness may increase simultaneously. Anecdotal evi-
dence suggests that in England regulatory restrictiveness is strongly
pro-cyclical. In times of high demand, planners reject more proposals in
attractive areas, perhaps to avoid what they perceive as a threatened
‘oversupply’ and perhaps because the system cannot cope with the
workload. Because housing supply takes time to adjust, this will lead to
lower local vacancy rates during boom periods. This again implies that
α is likely strongly downward biased if we estimate (2) by OLS.
We therefore have to ﬁnd an instrumental variable to identify re-
fusal rates that is uncorrelated with local unobserved shocks. Bertrand
and Kramarz (2002) exploit the cumulative representation of each po-
litical party at regional level as an instrument for how restrictive French
départments are likely to be towards new retail entrants to document
that stronger deterrence of entry by regional zoning boards increased
retailer concentration and slowed down employment concentration. In
a similar vein, Cheshire et al. (2015), Sadun (2015) and Hilber and
Vermeulen (2016) use the share of party representation at LA-level as
Fig. 1. Correlation between vacancy rate and real house price.
10 We experimented with leads and lags. It appears that results become weaker when
moving away from year t, while regulation in t + 1 and t + 2 do not have an eﬀect on
vacancy rates. The results are available upon request.
11 Moreover, the elasticity between log of refused applications and log of total appli-
cations is essentially equal to one. This is suggestive that developers do not participate in
this kind of strategic behaviour. Nevertheless, to fully address this concern we employ an
instrumental variable strategy, discussed in more detail below.
12 One might also use a ﬁxed eﬀects approach. We test the robustness of our results to
using a ﬁxed eﬀects approach in Appendix 2 and show that results are very similar.
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an instrument to identify the impact of local regulatory restrictiveness
on, respectively, retail store-level output, the entry of large retail stores,
and house prices. Our study, to the best of our knowledge, is the ﬁrst to
(i) exploit the fact that the particular details of the electoral system of
local government in England generates random variation in local party
inﬂuence relative to vote share and (ii) use this exogenous variation to
identify the impact of local regulatory restrictiveness on housing and
Labour market outcomes.
Our speciﬁc instrument is the change in the number of seats for the
Labour party between election years close to the Census years.
Traditionally Labour voters and politicians have been less opposed to
new residential construction than their Conservative counterparts.
Labour councillors typically represent a part of the population that has
less housing equity and so is less subject to NIMBY pressures aiming to
protect house values. Labour councillors are also likely to be more in-
terested in the job generating eﬀects of construction. Thus, we can
expect that an increase in the share of Labour seats may induce LAs to
become less restrictive, yet, a change in the share of Labour seats should
not directly aﬀect the local vacancy rate other than through any eﬀects
it has on planning restrictiveness.
Fig. 2. Vacancy rate across England.
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To make the reasons for our choice of instrument clearer it may help
to have a brief explanation of the English local government system and
of the mechanics of the local electoral system.13 There is a recent,
succinct account available in Sandford (2016). The English system is
very heterogeneous but has certain common features. It is highly cen-
tralised. As is discussed below, for most purposes, LAs are hardly more
than agents of central government with legal obligations but little ﬁscal
autonomy; property taxes, for example, are essentially national taxes
(see Section 3.5) and there is no local income tax. The major area of
autonomy is with respect to planning decisions. There are a total of 354
LAs of three diﬀerent types: County Councils; District Councils; and
Unitary Authorities. The 125 Unitary Authorities – which have the
fullest range of functions – include the London and Metropolitan Bor-
oughs.
Members of the Councils of all LAs are elected for ‘wards’ – geo-
graphical subdivisions of the council's area – and all elections are
conducted on a ‘ﬁrst-past-the post’ system. Some LAs have single-
member wards, others multi-member wards. Voters vote for as many
councillors as there are vacant seats at any date there is an election. So
Fig. 3. Housing supply restrictions across England (refusal rate by
LA).
13 Since all our analysis is only for English LAs we only discuss the English system here.
Systems in Scotland and other countries of the UK diﬀer.
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if, for example, all members of a three-member ward face re-election on
the same date, the elector will have three votes. To complicate matters
further some councils elect all their members every three years; others
elect one third of their members at any given election while a few elect
half their members each year, so political control can change rapidly.
Over the period of our analysis there were three main political
groups: The Labour, Conservative and Liberal-Democrat parties. As
with any ﬁrst-past-the post system the party winning a seat contested
by three parties may have a minority of votes; in wards where one party
is dominant, their candidate may have only token opposition or even
none at all. Equally, councils may be quite evenly split in terms of vote
shares for the diﬀerent parties.
Thus there are two independent reasons why the share of votes at
any election and the share of seats on the council may diﬀer. The ﬁrst is
just the way that the ﬁrst-past-the-post voting system works when there
are three parties all gaining signiﬁcant vote shares but those shares are
highly variable between constituencies. The second is that in many
councils only one third or a half of the elected members are voted for at
any election. So the composition of the council is a moving average of
past votes. And, of course, the share cast for any party may change
signiﬁcantly over the course of even a year. The result is that the share
of votes and the number of members on a council is not perfectly cor-
related—for the purposes of our identiﬁcation strategy important: the
discrepancy between the two can be considered random. The correla-
tion between the share of Labour votes and seats, for example, is 0.77.
As is explained in Appendix 1, the variable we use for ‘seats’ is the
closest measure we can ﬁnd for ‘seats controlled on the council’ so al-
lows for the fact that in many councils only a third or a half of members
are elected in any given election.
To illustrate the random element of seats won beyond vote shares,
in Fig. 4, we provide a scatterplot of the share of Labour votes and share
of Labour seats from 1978 to 2011 for each year and LA. Not surpris-
ingly there is a strong positive correlation between seats and votes.
However, below a vote share of about one third, any vote share
translates into a less than proportional number of seats (denoted by the
dashed line). In a number of cases, votes did not translate into any seats
at all. Furthermore, because of the ﬁrst-past-the-post feature of the
system, above a vote share of about one third, an increase in the vote
share leads to a more than proportional number of seats. If the Labour
party has a vote share of> 70%, this usually implies that all seats are
assigned to the Labour party.
So ﬁrst, we only use the variation in the change in number of Labour
seats in an LA:
= + +−rv α θΔΔ Δϵ ,tt t tℓ 2ℓ, , ℓ, (3)
= + +∼
∼
− −r α s θΔ Δ Δϵ~ ,t t t tℓ 2, ℓ, 2 ℓ, (3.1)
where bold indicates that changes in the regulatory constraints mea-
sure Δrℓ, t − 2 are instrumented by changes in the share Labour seats Δsℓt
and the ~ refers to ﬁrst stage parameters.
One might still be concerned that our instruments are correlated
with Δϵℓ, t, so the next step is to include LA ﬁxed eﬀects ηℓ:
= + + +−rv α η θΔΔ Δϵ ,tt t tℓ 2ℓ, , ℓ ℓ, (4)
= + + +∼
∼∼
− −r α s η θΔ Δ Δϵ~ .t t t tℓ 2, ℓ, 2 ℓ ℓ, (4.1)
By including LA ﬁxed eﬀects ηℓ, we control for all linear trends
caused by unobservable factors, which increases the likelihood that
changes in the instruments are uncorrelated with Δϵℓ, t.
If the instruments are valid (so uncorrelated with omitted variables
and therefore the error term), adding additional control variables,
should not inﬂuence the parameter of interest α, but also should not
have an impact on the ﬁrst-stage coeﬃcients of the instrument. To test
this, we include other, potentially endogenous, control variables, like
changes in the demographic composition:
= + ∆ + + +−rv α β x η θΔΔ Δϵ ,tt t t tℓ 2ℓ, , ℓ, ℓ ℓ, (5)
= + ∆ + + +∼
∼∼∼
− −r α s β x η θΔ Δ Δϵ~ ,t t t t tℓ 2, ℓ, 2 ℓ, ℓ ℓ, (5.1)
where Δxℓ, t is a vector of changes in the control variables. One of our
control variables is the change in log local average earnings as a proxy
for local demand. One might be particularly concerned about the en-
dogeneity of earnings and we are also interested in the impact of this
variable on local vacancy rates. Thus, in a robustness check, following
Hilber and Vermeulen (2016), we instrument for this variable, also,
using a measure that captures local demand shocks (a Bartik, 1991-type
instrument). We do not include local house prices as a control since, as
we discuss in Section 2, we would expect that regulatory restrictiveness
inﬂuences vacancy rates in part through house prices. Moreover, house
prices and vacancy rates are jointly determined by restrictions.
The main objection to the validity of the change in the share Labour
Fig. 4. Correlation between Labour votes and Labour seats.
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seats-instrument is that it may be correlated with (potentially non-
linear) unobserved trends. For example, some local housing markets in
the Greater London Area have experienced a substantial inﬂow of
wealthy residents during the last two decades, leading to changes in the
demographic composition of the local market and therefore also to
changes in voting behaviour. We thus control for a ﬂexible function of
local vote shares of the previous local election, identifying regulatory
restrictiveness from the random component generated by the particular
features of the English local government and electoral systems dis-
cussed above which ensure the seats allocated to parties are very
seldom proportional to the number of votes. So what we eﬀectively use
to identify regulatory restrictiveness is the number of seats that Labour
won (or lost) beyond their vote share. While Labour's local vote share may
be correlated with various demographic and socio-economic char-
acteristics of the constituency, holding local vote shares constant, seats
won (or lost) above and beyond should be uncorrelated with the error
term. We can express our ﬁnal estimating (base) equation as:
= + ∆ + + + +−rv α β x π η θΔΔ Ω(Δ ) Δϵ ,tt t t t tℓ 2ℓ, , ℓ, ℓ, ℓ ℓ, (6)
= + ∆ + + + +∼
∼∼∼ ∼
− −r α s β x π η θΔ Δ Ω(Δ ) Δϵ~ ,t t t t t tℓ 2, ℓ, 2 ℓ, ℓ, ℓ ℓ, (6.1)
where πℓ, t is the share of Labour votes in the closest previous local
elections, and
= ∑
= ∑
∼
=
=
π γ π
π γ π
Ω(Δ ) Δ( ) and
Ω(Δ ) Δ( ).͠
t n
N
n t
n
t n
N
n t
n
ℓ, 1 ℓ,
ℓ, 1 ℓ, (6.2)
Hence, Ω(∙) and ∙∼Ω( ) are Nth order polynomials of local vote shares
πℓ, t and γn and γ͠n are parameters to be estimated.
Despite the fact that we identify changes in regulatory restrictive-
ness from the random component generated by the particular features
of the English local government system, one might still be concerned
that greater Labour representation does not only aﬀect regulatory re-
strictiveness but may also aﬀect other local variables that may sepa-
rately aﬀect local vacancy rates. That is, the exclusion restriction may
be violated. To address this crucial concern we ﬁrst argue and provide
evidence to support the claim that — unlike in countries with decen-
tralised government structures— LAs in England, especially since 1972,
have very little ﬁscal discretion or power other than making planning
decisions.14 Next, we show that even for those LAs — Unitary Autho-
rities — that provide more local services than others, the eﬀect of a
random increase in the local Labour representation has a very similar
eﬀect on local restrictiveness. This suggests that the relation between
the share of Labour seats and local restrictiveness may not be sig-
niﬁcantly biased by other local policies and services that may be cor-
related with both regulatory restrictiveness and local vacancy rates.
Most reassuringly, when we run a battery of placebo (ﬁrst-stage) spe-
ciﬁcations, in which we replace the change in local refusal rates with
changes in local expenditures — our placebo variables — we ﬁnd no
signiﬁcant relationship between share Labour seats and these placebo
measures (see Section 3.5). This is in contrast to a strong and statisti-
cally signiﬁcant negative relationship between the random change in
the share of Labour seats and local refusal rates. Overall, these results
provide a strong indication that the exclusion restriction is not violated
and our identiﬁcation strategy is valid.
3.3. Results for housing vacancies
We start by ignoring any potential endogeneity issues and simply
regress the vacancy rate on the refusal rate of major residential projects
(Eq. (1)). From Fig. 5 we can see that the cross-sectional relationship
between the major refusal and the vacancy rates is negative. The re-
gression line implies that a one standard deviation increase in refusal
rates is associated with a 0.23 percentage point decrease in the vacancy
rate (s.e. 0.040). This naïve correlation provides ‘common sense’ evi-
dence supporting the view that vacant houses can be ‘regulated away’.
However, the quantitative impact is not very large.
Table 2 reports estimates for Eqs. (2) to (6). In the cases of Eqs. (3)
to (6) these are the second stage results of our IV-estimates. In column
(1) we regress the change in the vacancy rate on the change in the refusal
rate still ignoring potential endogeneity issues (Eq. 2). We ﬁrst diﬀer-
ence controls to oﬀset for any time invariant omitted characteristics
such as diﬀerences in income levels across LAs. We see that even
without instrumenting for the refusal rate or adding control variables,
the relationship between (the change in) planning restrictiveness and
(the change in) the vacancy rate is no longer negative and statistically
signiﬁcant.
However, because of the endogeneity concerns discussed above, the
coeﬃcient on the refusal rate cannot be interpreted as a causal eﬀect.
So in column (2) we include LA ﬁxed eﬀects. The coeﬃcient on the
change in the refusal rate variable now becomes positive and statisti-
cally signiﬁcant at the 10% level. In column (3) of Table 2 we add
further controls as discussed in Section 3.1 above. The estimated
coeﬃcient for the change in the refusal rate is hardly aﬀected, although
it is not statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels anymore. The
control variables often have a statistically signiﬁcant impact on the
change in the vacancy rate with the anticipated sign. For example, areas
with an increasing share of elderly people or of council housing ex-
perience an increase in the vacancy rate. Also, areas with an increasing
unemployment rate, from which people may have been tending to move
away, experience an increase in the vacancy rate. In areas with a rising
share of highly educated people, vacancies tend to decrease.
Still, however, regulatory restrictiveness is likely measured with
error (because developers may not apply in the ﬁrst place in more re-
strictive places). It may also be correlated with unobserved shocks.
Moreover, we should address the potential reverse causality issue that
higher vacancy rates may induce policy makers to be more restrictive.
We therefore instrument for the change in the refusal rate with the
change in the share of Labour seats in column (4). This speciﬁcation
corresponds to Eq. (3) above.
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistics indicate that there are no issues of weak
identiﬁcation of regulatory restrictiveness. The results suggest that a
one standard deviation increase in the refusal rate leads to an increase
in the vacancy rate of 0.82 percentage points. As noted in the previous
subsection, one objection to the instrument is that it may be correlated
with unobserved characteristics of the area. To control for this, we in-
clude LA ﬁxed eﬀects in column (5) – corresponding to Eq. (4). The
coeﬃcient on the refusal rate hardly changes and remains statistically
signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Column (6), corresponding to Eq. (5), in-
cludes the same range of control variables as in column (3). This makes
almost no diﬀerence to the estimated coeﬃcient of primary interest.
One might still be worried that changes in the share of Labour seats
are correlated with unobservable shocks (e.g. gentriﬁcation) that si-
multaneously have an impact on voting behaviour and vacancy rates.
So in column (7) we estimate our ﬁnal model (6). That is, we ad-
ditionally include a ﬂexible function of changes in the share of Labour
votes in local elections, approximated by a ﬁfth-order polynomial to
isolate the impact of voting behaviour caused by any change in the
demographic and socio-economic composition of the LA from political
power (measured by seats). In the sensitivity checks, discussed below,
we report results for diﬀerent orders of polynomials. Reassuringly, the
estimated eﬀect of regulatory restrictiveness in column (7) is very si-
milar to the previous speciﬁcations. The instrument is somewhat less
strong (with a Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic of 8.2). Still, we ﬁnd a posi-
tive and economically meaningful eﬀect of regulatory restrictiveness on
the vacancy rate: a one standard deviation increase in the refusal rate
increases the vacancy rate by 0.90 percentage points. Due to the
14 Perhaps surprisingly, Ferreira and Gyourko (2009) ﬁnd that in the US – where
municipalities may be thought to have greater local discretion – whether the city mayor is
a Democrat or a Republican makes little diﬀerence to a range of outcomes at the city
level, including total expenditure or its allocation.
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Fig. 5. Cross-sectional relationship between refusal rate and vacancy rate.
Table 2
Baseline results – second stage. (Dependent variable: Δ vacancy rate).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Δ Refusal rate, t-2 0.0434 0.101⁎ 0.0801+ 0.820⁎⁎ 0.855⁎⁎ 0.840⁎⁎ 0.895⁎
(0.0382) (0.0532) (0.0501) (0.417) (0.405) (0.354) (0.530)
Δ Earnings (log) 0.373 −0.0701 −0.125
(0.677) (0.692) (0.719)
Δ Share owner-occupied housing −0.129 −0.262 −0.321
(0.356) (0.369) (0.418)
Δ Share council housing 0.736⁎⁎⁎ 0.655⁎⁎⁎ 0.631⁎⁎⁎
(0.235) (0.219) (0.233)
Δ Share age 30–65 −0.0989 0.0550 0.0754
(0.208) (0.202) (0.211)
Δ Share age > 65 1.281⁎⁎⁎ 1.432⁎⁎⁎ 1.362⁎⁎⁎
(0.317) (0.311) (0.319)
Δ Share unemployed 0.368⁎⁎⁎ 0.270⁎⁎ 0.276⁎⁎
(0.138) (0.114) (0.136)
Δ Share highly educated −0.493⁎⁎ −0.581⁎⁎⁎ −0.617⁎⁎⁎
(0.191) (0.189) (0.214)
Δ Share permanent illness 0.192⁎⁎ 0.151 0.123
(0.0972) (0.0934) (0.0985)
Year ﬁxed eﬀects (3) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Local authority ﬁxed eﬀects (350) No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Δ Share Labour voters local elections Ω(∙) No No No No No No Yes
Observations 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050
R-squared 0.373 0.488 0.559
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 18.52 17.49 19.01 8.151
Notes: All independent variables (except for earnings) are standardised with mean zero and unit standard deviation. Bold indicates instrumented. In Models (4)–(7), the instrument for Δ
Refusal rate is Δ Share of Labour seats in the LA. Ω(∙) is approximated by a ﬁfth-order polynomial of share Labour voters in local elections. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at
the LA level.
+ p < 0.15.
⁎ p < 0.10.
⁎⁎ p < 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p < 0.01.
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correlation between changes in the Labour vote shares and changes in
the share of Labour seats, it is no surprise that the coeﬃcient is now
only statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level.15
In Table 3 we report the corresponding ﬁrst-stage estimates: a
standard deviation increase in the share of Labour seats leads to a de-
crease in the refusal rate of 0.26–0.34 standard deviations. It is notable
that the ﬁrst-stage coeﬃcients of the change in the share of Labour seats
instrument are highly statistically signiﬁcant and are hardly aﬀected by
the inclusion of LA ﬁxed eﬀects and other control variables. If we in-
clude vote share controls, the coeﬃcient on change in Labour seats
becomes slightly lower, but it is still statistically signiﬁcant at the 5%
level.
3.4. Results for commuting distance
In Section 2 we hypothesised that a positive relationship between
restrictions and vacancy rates might be explained by increased mis-
match. There are few obvious measures of mismatch but for reasons
discussed earlier we think that the ‘average commuting distance from
the workplace’ does not only provide a useful measure but can poten-
tially illuminate in a useful way the underlying interrelationship be-
tween spatial housing and Labour markets. Moreover longer commutes
unambiguously signal a welfare loss. One of the most important char-
acteristics of a house is its location with respect to jobs. It seems rea-
sonable therefore that the average commuting distance from the
workplace should capture mismatch in this dimension of housing
characteristics for any given housing market. In principle, households
have a preference to live close to their workplaces. If regulatory re-
strictions make it more diﬃcult for people to ﬁnd a home ‘matched’ to
their preferences on other characteristics close to work, their search
takes longer and will extend further. This adaptation of search beha-
viour implies, other things equal, vacancies will tend to be higher in the
more restrictive LAs and lower in neighbouring, less restrictive ones, as
workers become more locationally mismatched.16 We provide evidence
that regulation also has an impact on other proxies for mismatch in
Section 3.6.
Table 4 replicates Table 2 except that the log of average commuting
distance replaces the vacancy rate as the dependent variable. The re-
sults very closely parallel those for vacancies. Those in the ﬁrst column
suggest that commuting distance is not inﬂuenced by regulatory re-
strictiveness in the LA of the workplace. When we include LA ﬁxed
eﬀects and demographic control variables in columns (2) and (3), the
results are still statistically insigniﬁcant. This is not too surprising as the
refusal rate is highly endogenous and correlated with other factors that
might explain commuting distances. For example, places that have
become denser might have tended to become more restrictive (Hilber
and Robert-Nicoud, 2013), but denser places also might have shorter
commutes because jobs and households are located closer to each other.
In column (4) we therefore control for other factors that might be
correlated with the refusal rate by instrumenting for the change in the
refusal rate with the change in the share of Labour seats, as in Table 2.
This reveals a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect. As restrictiveness in the LA
in which a worker is employed increases so does the average com-
muting distance: a one standard deviation increase in the refusal rate in
the workplace LA increases the commuting distance of its employees by
8.5%, a non-negligible eﬀect. The eﬀect becomes somewhat smaller
(5.8%) when we include in column (5) LA ﬁxed eﬀects. The eﬀect
continues to be essentially the same when we add further control
variables in column (6) and a ﬂexible function of the share of Labour
votes in column (7), with 5.9 and 6.1% respectively. In the last column
the eﬀect is somewhat imprecisely estimated and only statistically
signiﬁcant at the 14% level.17 On the other hand, the results are con-
sistent in pointing towards a meaningful eﬀect of regulatory restric-
tiveness on commuting distance, and therefore increasing the spatial
mismatch between home and work locations.
3.5. Evidence in support of the identiﬁcation strategy
The central assumption of our identiﬁcation strategy is that a
random increase in the local representation of the Labour party only
inﬂuences local regulatory restrictiveness and does not separately aﬀect
other local decisions that may themselves be correlated with local va-
cancy rates. If this assumption does not hold, then the exclusion re-
striction is violated.
In this context it is important to ﬁrst re-emphasise that LAs in
England have considerable discretion over local planning decisions.
However, unlike, for example, in the US, they have almost no local
ﬁscal resources and very limited ability to determine local public ser-
vice levels since these are largely set by central government. To a large
extent local jurisdictions – LAs – are simply agencies of central gov-
ernment in charge of delivering services locally to regulated national
criteria using a dedicated budget stream for each purpose (such as
education, social services, local roads and street cleaning or refuse
collection). These direct grants of revenue from central government
have over the past 75 years or so accounted for some 80% of LA
Table 3
Baseline results – ﬁrst stage. (Dependent variable: Δ refusal rate, t-2).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS OLS OLS
Δ Share Labour seats, t-2 −0.301*** −0.322*** −0.343*** −0.264**
(0.0700) (0.0943) (0.0966) (0.114)
Δ Earnings (log) 0.579 0.504
(0.461) (0.468)
Δ Share owner-occupied
housing
0.250 0.318
(0.327) (0.323)
Δ Share council housing 0.0880 0.113
(0.186) (0.188)
Δ Share age 30–65 −0.194 −0.184
(0.150) (0.151)
Δ Share age > 65 −0.160 −0.148
(0.220) (0.218)
Δ Share unemployed 0.112 0.134
(0.0880) (0.0874)
Δ Share highly educated 0.167 0.189
(0.171) (0.175)
Δ Share permanent illness 0.0828 0.0673
(0.0826) (0.0865)
Year ﬁxed eﬀects (3) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Local authority ﬁxed
eﬀects (350)
No Yes Yes Yes
Δ Share Labour voters
local elections ∙∼Ω( )
No No No Yes
Observations 1050 1050 1050 1050
R-squared 0.168 0.310 0.324 0.331
Notes: All independent variables (except for earnings) are standardised with mean zero
and unit standard deviation. ∙∼Ω( ) is approximated by a ﬁfth-order polynomial of share
Labour voters in local elections. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the LA
level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10, + p < 0.15.
15 The correlation between the share Labour votes and the share Labour seats for the
Census years is 0.88 (note that it is 0.77 when we take all available years into account, see
Figure 4). However, the correlation between the change in share Labour votes and the
change in share Labour seats is much lower (ρ= 0.481).
16 The impact of greater restrictiveness in a given LA on vacancies in the aggregate is
beyond the scope of this paper. The elasticity of substitution between housing char-
acteristics (including location with respect to job) is unknown; nor is the extent to which
people may adopt alternative strategies to accepting longer commutes such as living with
parents, friends or taking temporary accommodation.
17 One may argue that earnings are endogenous, leading to biased results. When we
instrument for earnings with a Bartik (1991)-type Labour demand shock variable, the
results are very similar. The point estimates related to the refusal rate are around 7%,
while the standard errors are even somewhat lower.
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spending. Revenues from taxes on residential property are subject to
revenue equalisation across LAs so that local resources are ‘needs’ based
and revenues to LAs become, with only a short delay, independent of
the local property tax base: commercial property taxes since 1990 have
been a national tax.
Over the ﬁrst half of the 20th Century LAs did gain an increasing
role in the provision of social housing – ‘council housing’. This was not
initially designed to be ‘safety net’ housing for the very poor and de-
prived but rather public housing for those not wanting or not able to
become owner occupiers. At the start of the 20th Century owner oc-
cupation as a tenure accounted for only about 10% of all housing.
Council houses were built to common nationally set design guidelines
but delivery was under local control as was the setting of rents (subject
to the wider ﬁnancial rules governing LAs' budgets). This housing role
of local government peaked in the 1950s and 1960s and declined
thereafter. By the late 1980s the construction of LA (council) housing
had almost stopped and local powers to set rents had been all but
abolished. The two key changes were the Housing Finance Act of 1972,
which required LAs to set nationally deﬁned ‘fair’ rents, and the in-
troduction of the Right to Buy for LA tenants, introduced in 1980.18
Tables 5 and 6 provide empirical evidence to support the above
account of how limited the powers of LAs in England are except for
their powers over development. In Table 5 we test whether the provi-
sion of public services is aﬀected by the political composition of an LA
more directly by looking at expenditures on services, such as education,
personal services (e.g. social care), highways, (social) housing and
planning. We then run a series of placebo tests by replicating the pre-
ferred ﬁrst-stage results in column (7) of Table 3, but using diﬀerent
dependent variables. Instead of the change in the refusal rate we use the
log change in the following variables: education expenses, social ser-
vices expenses, highway expenses, local housing expenses, local plan-
ning expenses, and total local expenses.19 Our identiﬁcation strategy
stipulates that a random change in the share of Labour seats should only
signiﬁcantly reduce the refusal rate but should not aﬀect the ex-
penditures on various public services. Indeed, that is what Table 5 re-
veals.
The coeﬃcients for the change in the share of Labour seats on ex-
penses are in all cases highly statistically insigniﬁcant. The only ex-
ception is a weakly signiﬁcant eﬀect on the total local expenditures (p-
value = 0.15). The coeﬃcient seems to suggest that a one a standard
deviation increase in the share of Labour seats increases local spending
by 8.75%. Although the eﬀect is not statistically particularly strong, one
may be worried that the share of Labour seats has a direct impact on
vacancy rates via the total expenditures of local planning authorities,
which would call into question the exclusion restriction.
In Appendix 2 (Table A2.1) we therefore re-estimate the preferred
speciﬁcation in Table 2 (column (7)), but include expenditure by ca-
tegory, one by one, as additional controls (columns (1) to (5)). In
column (6), Table A2.1, we instead include total local expenditures as
an additional control. The results show that the impact of the refusal
rate on vacancy rates is essentially unaﬀected, even when we control
for total local expenditures or for each category of expenditure in-
dividually. Planning expenses seem to have some direct negative impact
on vacancy rates (column (5)): more planning expenses lead to lower
Table 4
Baseline results – second stage. (Dependent variable: Δ commuting distance from workplace (log)).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Δ Refusal rate, t-2 −0.00274 0.00341 0.00106 0.0847⁎⁎⁎ 0.0584⁎⁎ 0.0594⁎⁎ 0.0608+
(0.00283) (0.00400) (0.00384) (0.0321) (0.0296) (0.0274) (0.0407)
Δ Earnings (log) 0.179⁎⁎⁎ 0.145⁎⁎⁎ 0.139⁎⁎
(0.0567) (0.0548) (0.0548)
Δ Share owner-occupied housing 0.0551⁎ 0.0449+ 0.0420
(0.0286) (0.0296) (0.0328)
Δ Share council housing −0.00297 −0.00916 −0.0100
(0.0177) (0.0158) (0.0163)
Δ Share age 30–65 −0.0216+ −0.00982 −0.00803
(0.0131) (0.0145) (0.0153)
Δ Share age > 65 0.0168 0.0285 0.0225
(0.0319) (0.0312) (0.0319)
Δ Share unemployed 0.0181⁎⁎ 0.0106 0.0120
(0.00755) (0.00781) (0.00927)
Δ Share highly educated 0.00129 −0.00544 −0.00902
(0.0123) (0.0122) (0.0139)
Δ Share permanent illness −0.0245⁎⁎⁎ −0.0277⁎⁎⁎ −0.0306⁎⁎⁎
(0.00915) (0.00882) (0.00912)
Year ﬁxed eﬀects (3) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Local authority ﬁxed eﬀects (350) No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Δ Share Labour voters local elections Ω(∙) No No No No No No Yes
Observations 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050
R-squared 0.373 0.913 0.559
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 18.52 17.49 19.01 8.151
Notes: All independent variables (except for earnings) are standardised with mean zero and unit standard deviation. Bold indicates instrumented. In Models (4)–(7), the instrument for Δ
Refusal rate is Δ Share of Labour seats in the LA. Ω(∙) is approximated by a ﬁfth-order polynomial of share Labour voters in local elections. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at
the LA level.
+ p < 0.15.
⁎ p < 0.10.
⁎⁎ p < 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p < 0.01.
18 The Housing Finance Act led to the famous Clay Cross dispute in which local
councillors in Clay Cross in Derbyshire were eventually jailed for refusing to set ‘fair
rents’. In just seven years following the introduction of the Right to Buy over 1 million
council houses were sold oﬀ. Thus while some council houses still exist, local control of
them was eﬀectively abolished from 1972.
19 Because we cannot take the log of a negative number, we exclude observations with
negative expenditures. We also have estimated the same regressions using the ex-
penditure variables in levels, leading to qualitatively the same conclusions.
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Table 5
Placebo tests for expenditures.
Dependent variable: Δ Education
expenditures (log)
Δ Social services
expenditures (log)
Δ Highway
expenditures (log)
Δ Housing
expenditures (log)
Δ Planning
expenditures (log)
Δ Total local
expenditures (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Δ Share Labour seats, t-2 0.0231 −0.0107 0.0224 0.126 0.00629 0.0875+
(0.0550) (0.0165) (0.0321) (0.110) (0.0871) (0.0559)
Year ﬁxed eﬀects (3) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Local authority ﬁxed
eﬀects (350)
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control variables (8) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Δ Share Labour voters
local elections Ω(∙)
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1050 1050 1047 1014 1024 1050
R-squared 0.082 0.583 0.529 0.661 0.431 0.326
Notes: Δ Share Labour seats, t-2 is standardised with mean zero and unit standard deviation. Ω(∙) is approximated by a ﬁfth-order polynomial of share Labour voters in local elections.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the LA level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10, + p < 0.15.
Table 6
Results for Unitary Authorities and other LAs.
Panel A – (Dependent variable: Δ refusal rate, t-2) (1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS OLS OLS
Δ Share Labour seats, t-2× other local authority −0.326*** −0.352*** −0.365*** −0.291**
(0.0743) (0.0998) (0.102) (0.120)
Δ Share Labour seats, t-2×Unitary authority −0.144 −0.121 −0.187 −0.153
(0.162) (0.210) (0.205) (0.215)
Year ﬁxed eﬀects (3) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Local authority FEs (350) No Yes Yes Yes
Control variables included (8) No No Yes Yes
Δ Share Labour voters local elections ∙∼Ω( ) No No No Yes
Observations 1050 1050 1050 1050
R-squared 0.169 0.311 0.325 0.326
Panel B – (Dependent variable: Δ vacancy rate) (1) (2) (3) (4)
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Δ Refusal rate, t-2 0.915** 0.906** 0.855** 0.935*
(0.423) (0.399) (0.359) (0.541)
Δ Share Labour seats, t-2×Unitary authority 0.209 0.126 0.0421 0.0786
(0.207) (0.216) (0.196) (0.212)
Year ﬁxed eﬀects (3) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Local authority FEs (350) No Yes Yes Yes
Control variables included (8) No No Yes Yes
Δ Share Labour voters local elections ∙∼Ω( ) No No No Yes
Observations 1050 1050 1050 1050
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 19.31 18.65 19.25 8.354
Panel C – (Dependent variable: Δ commuting
distance from workplace (log))
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Δ Refusal rate, t-2 0.102*** 0.0735** 0.0664** 0.0720*
(0.0342) (0.0307) (0.0284) (0.0432)
Δ Share Labour seats, t-2×Unitary authority 0.0371** 0.0377*** 0.0195 0.0217+
(0.0164) (0.0139) (0.0136) (0.0141)
Year ﬁxed eﬀects (3) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Local authority FEs (350) No Yes Yes Yes
Control variables included (8) No No Yes Yes
Δ Share Labour voters local elections ∙∼Ω( ) No No No Yes
Observations 1050 1050 1050 1050
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 19.31 18.65 19.25 8.354
Notes: Bold indicates instrumented. The instrument is Δ Share Labour seats, t-2×Other Local authority. All independent variables (except for earnings) are standardised with mean zero
and unit standard deviation. Ω (∙) is approximated by a ﬁfth-order polynomial of share Labour voters in local elections. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the LA level. ***
p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10, + p < 0.15.
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vacancy rates. In column (6) we show that, even if the share of Labour
seats might have a positive eﬀect on total local expenditures, it seems
that local expenditures do not have a direct impact on vacancy rates.
Hence, this provides additional evidence that the exclusion restriction
holds. We repeat this exercise in Table A2.2, Appendix 2 with com-
muting distance as dependent variable and show that the estimated
coeﬃcients are also very similar to the baseline speciﬁcation.
Table 6 provides further evidence supporting this narrative. First we
replicate our baseline results but we allow for the coeﬃcient on the
share Labour seats to vary between Unitary LAs and all other LAs.
Unitary Authorities have a wider remit in terms of the types of services
they can provide. We therefore use as an instrument the change in the
share Labour seats interacted with a dummy indicating whether an LA
is not a Unitary Authority and control directly for the change in share
Labour seats interacted with a dummy indicating whether an LA is a
Unitary Authority. The ﬁrst-stage results, reported in Panel A of
Table 6, reveal that the coeﬃcient on the share Labour seats is similar
for the two types of LAs: the coeﬃcient for Unitary Authorities is
somewhat lower but not statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the
coeﬃcient for other LAs. This also suggests that the local share of La-
bour seats does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the nature and quality of local
service provision (which in turn might be correlated with regulatory
restrictiveness and local vacancy rates). Indeed, Panel B of Table 6
shows that the baseline results for vacancy rates are essentially un-
aﬀected. Finally if we replace the vacancy rate by the log commuting
distance in Panel C of Table 6, the results are again similar. This is
indicative that LAs with a greater remit of service provision are not
fundamentally diﬀerent from those that have a more limited re-
mit—presumably this is because even Unitary Authorities have very
little discretion over services other than planning decisions.
3.6. Other evidence for the importance of mismatch
As noted in Section 2 we also investigate the impact of local re-
strictiveness on other symptoms or measures potentially capturing
mismatch, such as the rate of new construction, the share of properties
which are crowded, the share of non-permanent properties and mi-
grants. The results are shown in Table 7. We replicate the preferred
speciﬁcation where we instrument for the refusal rate and include ﬁxed
eﬀects and control variables (as in column (7) in Tables 2 and 4).20
We ﬁrst investigate a symptom of restrictiveness which would be
expected to induce greater mismatch: whether in more restrictive areas,
despite the eﬀect on prices, it is more diﬃcult to build additional
houses. Because the refusal rate should have an impact on the absolute
number of dwellings, we regress the change of the number of dwellings
(rather than logs) in an LA on the refusal rate, while additionally
controlling for the number of dwellings (in levels).21 Column (1) of
Table 7 shows that on average over a ten year period, a one standard
deviation increase in regulatory restrictiveness in an LA reduces the
number of additional dwellings by more than half a standard deviation
of the growth in the number of dwellings over this time period (about
1800 dwellings per LA). To make sure that this eﬀect is not entirely
explained by larger LAs we include a ﬁfth-order polynomial of the
number of dwellings and control for house prices in column (2). In line
with expectations, a higher price is associated with a slower growth in
the number of dwellings, most likely because higher prices are pre-
dominantly found in already developed areas with fewer possibilities to
extend the building stock (see Hilber and Vermeulen, 2016). More re-
levantly for present purposes, the eﬀect of regulation on new dwelling
supply is essentially unaﬀected once we control for prices.
Another symptom of mismatch is the share of oﬃcially classiﬁed
‘crowded’ properties – properties with more than one person per room:
some 2% of all properties. If households cannot ﬁnd a property to their
liking and cannot aﬀord larger properties, they are likely to end up in
smaller properties, perhaps staying with their partner in the parental
home. Column (3) in Table 7 shows that there is indeed a positive eﬀect
of regulation on the share of crowded properties. One may argue that
this results from the fact that tighter controls make housing more ex-
pensive so that households will occupy smaller homes with fewer
rooms. However, when we control for house prices in column (4) the
eﬀect of regulation on the share of crowded properties is very similar,
even somewhat stronger. House prices are, as expected, positively as-
sociated with crowding. The coeﬃcient indicates that a standard de-
viation increase in the refusal rate leads to a 0.58 percentage points
Table 7
Alternative proxies for mismatch.
Dependent variable: Δ Dwellings Δ Share crowded properties Δ Share non-permanent properties Δ Share migrants
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Δ Refusal rate, t-2 −1829** −1821* 0.505* 0.576* 0.181+ 0.213+ −1.139 −1.535*
(931.7) (988.4) (0.284) (0.340) (0.114) (0.132) (0.796) (0.923)
Δ House price (log) −2136* 0.546+ 0.249* −3.050***
(1102) (0.370) (0.130) (1.128)
Year ﬁxed eﬀects (3) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Local authority ﬁxed eﬀects (350) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control variables (8) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Δ Share Labour voters local elections Ω(∙) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Δ Dwellings Ψ(∙) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 8.053 6.708 8.151 6.438 8.151 6.438 8.151 6.438
Notes: The Δ Refusal rate is standardised with mean zero and unit standard deviation. Bold indicates instrumented. The instrument for Δ Refusal rate is Δ Share of seats in the LA. Ω(∙) is
approximated by a ﬁfth-order polynomial of share Labour voters in local elections. Ψ(∙) is approximated by a linear term in column (1) and by a ﬁfth-order polynomial of the number of
dwellings in column (2). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the LA level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10, + p < 0.15.
20 We experimented with alternative datasets to provide further evidence for the
mismatch mechanism. Speciﬁcally, one implication of mismatch is the proposition that
the local housing transaction volumes (or, respectively, time-on-the market) should be
less responsive to demand shocks in more restrictive locations. To test this proposition we
(footnote continued)
collected data from the UK Land Registry and replicated the analysis in Hilber and
Vermeulen (2016), but using the local transaction volume as the dependent variable
rather than house prices. Consistent with our theoretical prior, we ﬁnd that an increase in
(instrumented) regulatory restrictiveness has a highly statistically signiﬁcant negative
eﬀect on the transaction volume-earnings elasticity. The results are available upon re-
quest.
21 To limit the possibility that our results are driven by a few possibly incorrect out-
liers, we further exclude areas with a growth of> 20,000 dwellings or a decrease in the
number of dwellings. Inclusion of those areas, however, does not make a substantial
diﬀerence.
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increase in the share of crowded properties (about one-third of a
standard deviation). Hence, although the results are only signiﬁcant at
the 10% level, the implied magnitude of the point estimates is non-
negligible.
A further symptom or proxy for mismatch is explored in columns (5)
and (6) of Table 7, the share of non-permanent dwellings. Our under-
lying explanation for why this measure should proxy for housing
market mismatch is that in more restrictive markets there is an in-
centive to accept even less optimally matched housing characteristics in
the short term in order to intensify and increase the eﬃciency of search.
Living in temporary accommodation – mainly caravans or trailers - has
a low switching cost associated with it and is a cheaper strategy than
buying a suboptimal place to live and then reselling it when a more
suitable house is found. The ease with which search can be undertaken
and its eﬀectiveness will increase if the house-hunter can be physically
present in the local market (Ha and Hilber, 2013). Moreover since the
chances of ﬁnding a better match in the housing market will improve
with length of time spent searching then there will be a payoﬀ to having
temporary accommodation available for searchers in markets where
matching is more diﬃcult. Thus in more restrictive LAs, other things
equal, matching is more diﬃcult and the share of temporary dwellings
is greater. Although by improving the eﬃciency of search, temporary
housing may itself reduce vacancies of permanent dwellings, it is such a
relatively sub-optimal form of housing we would expect house-hunters
to resort to it only when there is extreme diﬃculty in matching their
preferences to available housing supply. So we would expect that the
net share of temporary housing would be positively correlated with
local restrictiveness. In column (5), Table 7, we ﬁnd weak but con-
sistent evidence that more restrictive markets have a higher rate of non-
permanent homes. Given that the change in non-permanent homes is a
somewhat noisy and indirect proxy for mismatch, it may not be too
surprising that the results are not statistically signiﬁcant at
conventional levels.22 Column (6) addresses the issue that this may be
entirely the result of higher house prices. This does not seem to be the
case; indeed the eﬀect becomes somewhat stronger. The coeﬃcient
implies that a standard deviation increase in the refusal rate leads to an
increase in the share of non-permanent homes of 0.213 percentage
points (about one-third of a standard deviation). This positive re-
lationship is certainly consistent with the proposition that more re-
strictive local planning increases the costs of matching would-be house
buyers in the local housing market to the available permanent housing,
inducing people to live temporarily in caravans and mobile homes –
clearly inferior substitutes to houses.
In column (7) of Table 7 we show the results for yet another
symptom or proxy for mismatch. We expect that tighter regulation in an
LA makes it harder for people to move into the preferred area and ﬁnd a
new, satisfactory property in it. Hence, we expect that the share of in-
migrants, deﬁned as households that had a diﬀerent address in the
previous year, is lower. We initially ﬁnd only very weak evidence
supporting this proposition with a p-value of 0.15. But migration re-
sponds not just to spatial diﬀerences in wages but also to house price
diﬀerences across space. So in column (8) we control for house prices.
Although house prices are indeed negatively correlated with the share
of migrants, controlling for house prices increases the eﬀect of regula-
tion. Not only is the relevant coeﬃcient larger but it is now signiﬁcant
at the 10% level. The coeﬃcient implies that a standard deviation in-
crease in the refusal rate leads to a reduction in the share of migrants of
1.53 percentage points (almost half of a standard deviation), a sub-
stantial eﬀect in economic terms.
Table 8
Real options, housing diversity and regulatory restrictiveness.
Panel A – second stage (Dependent variable: Δ coeﬃcient of
variation of house prices, t + 3)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Δ Refusal rate, t-2 0.00501 0.00784 0.00857 −0.0892* −0.119** −0.0726* −0.117*
(0.00453) (0.00743) (0.00659) (0.0480) (0.0605) (0.0434) (0.0680)
Δ Refusal rate, t-2× Coeﬃcient of variation of earnings, t + 3 −0.0375 −0.0725 −0.0758 0.804* 1.166** 0.693* 0.812*
(0.0606) (0.101) (0.0858) (0.411) (0.570) (0.368) (0.468)
Year ﬁxed eﬀects (3) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Local authority ﬁxed eﬀects (350) No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Control variables included (8) No No Yes No No Yes Yes
Δ Share Labour voters local elections Ω(∙) No No No No No No Yes
Observations 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050
R-squared 0.808 0.826 0.864
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 5.212 4.573 5.419 2.893
Panel B – second stage (Dependent variable: Δ room diversity) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Δ Refusal rate, t-2 −0.00186 −0.00410 −0.000875 0.0900* 0.0294 0.00427 0.0180
(0.00465) (0.00549) (0.00492) (0.0485) (0.0339) (0.0276) (0.0399)
Year ﬁxed eﬀects (3) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Local authority ﬁxed eﬀects (350) No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Control variables included (8) No No Yes No No Yes Yes
Δ Share Labour voters local elections Ω(∙) No No No No No No Yes
Observations 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050
R-squared 0.160 0.653 0.726
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 18.52 17.49 19.01 8.151
Notes: All independent variables (except for earnings) are standardised with mean zero and unit standard deviation. Bold indicates instrumented. In Models (4)–(7), instruments for Δ
Refusal rate and Δ Refusal rate × Coeﬃcient of variation of earnings are Δ Share of Labour seats and Δ Share of Labour seats × Coeﬃcient of variation of earnings. Ω(∙) is approximated
by a ﬁfth-order polynomial of share Labour voters. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the LA level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10, + p < 0.15.
22 Resort areas may, for example, quickly acquire or lose a caravan site as their po-
pularity changes.
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3.7. Other potential explanations
Are there other explanations for the positive relationship between
restrictions and vacancy rates? One might, for example, expect tighter
policy restricting the elasticity of supply to be associated with greater
price volatility and for that to be associated with higher vacancy rates.
This is because price volatility might create a (real) ‘option to wait’
(McDonald and Siegel, 1986; Grenadier, 1995, 1996). The greater the
uncertainty (price volatility) the more valuable is a property owner's
option to delay selling or renting out the property. Especially in markets
with lengthy leases – such as oﬃce markets – this can generate high and
persistent (“sticky”) vacancy rates; landlords are better oﬀ keeping their
units empty.
We would expect the real options argument to be less important in
the British residential property markets compared to oﬃce markets,
however, since demand volatility tends to be lower (people have to live
somewhere) and, for rentals, the length of tenancy agreements is ty-
pically quite short (a year or even less).
The real options argument, nevertheless, could be relevant since
tight regulation (more inelastic supply) ampliﬁes demand shocks, so we
would expect price volatility to respond more strongly to demand vo-
latility in places with tighter regulatory constraints. We proxy house
price volatility by calculating the coeﬃcient of variation of house prices
in the year of observation and the three years that follow. Demand
volatility is proxied by the coeﬃcient of variation of earnings based on
the year of observation and the three years that follow. The results
(reported in Panel A of Table 8) show that at least according to the
instrumental variable speciﬁcations (columns (4) to (7)), the sensitivity
of price volatility with respect to earnings volatility increases with
regulatory restrictiveness. This provides some evidence that regulatory
constraints potentially could increase vacancy rates by increasing price
volatility (i.e. increased price volatility raises the value of the real op-
tion to keep properties empty), but when we investigate this possibility
further (see results in Appendix 2, Table A2.3 and discussion below) the
evidence does not appear to support it.
Another argument might be that more regulation increases the
variance of house types, rather than decreasing the number of available
units, so that people have more choice than they would have without
regulation. If this were the case vacancy rates would be higher, but this
would not necessarily be a negative welfare eﬀect. To test for this
possibility we calculate a diversity index based on the share of prop-
erties with respectively 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, or 7+ rooms. Hence:
=
∑ =
div
s
1 ,t
r r t
ℓ,
1
7
,ℓ,
2 (7)
where sr, ℓ, t is the share of properties with r rooms in each local au-
thority in each year. We regress this diversity measure on the refusal
rate in Panel B of Table 8. The results show that diversity in the number
of rooms is not aﬀected by regulation. The results are generally far from
being statistically signiﬁcant and the point estimates are very close to
zero.23 Of course, any measure of housing diversity is ﬂawed, but this
exercise, as well as supporting anecdotal evidence,24 does not seem to
suggest that tighter regulation causes higher variance in housing types
so increased variance in housing types as a result of tighter regulation is
not a signiﬁcant driver for the eﬀects we ﬁnd in the paper.
In Appendix 2 we estimate regressions where we directly control for
commuting distance from the workplace, price volatility and room di-
versity. In Table A2.3 we show that the coeﬃcient on the (in-
strumented) refusal rate variable decreases by about 15% and ceases to
be statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels once we control for
commuting time (column (1)). This suggests that at least a part of the
positive eﬀect of a change in regulatory restrictiveness on the change in
vacancy rates is driven by mismatch in the housing market, as proxied
by commuting time. When we instead control for price volatility
(column (2)), interestingly, the eﬀect of the refusal rate on vacancy
rates increases somewhat in magnitude and is statistically signiﬁcant.
This ﬁnding could be interpreted as suggesting that the real options
argument does not play an important role in explaining the positive link
between regulatory restrictiveness and vacancy rates. When we include
room diversity in column (3) the eﬀect of regulation on vacancy rates
again becomes somewhat stronger, although it is close to that estimated
in the baseline speciﬁcation. Room diversity is, as expected, positively
correlated with vacancy rates; when diversity is one standard deviation
higher, vacancy rates are 0.65 percentage points higher. We ﬁnally
control for all variables, including the change in the share of crowded
properties, the share of non-permanent properties and the share of in-
migrants (column (4)). The coeﬃcient related to the refusal rate is very
similar to the previous speciﬁcations. We should note two caveats. First,
our proxies, for mismatch in particular, are at best partial and, in the
case particularly of the share of crowded and temporary properties, as
well as the share of in-migrants, more symptoms than measures, so we
would not expect these variables to fully account for the positive impact
of the (change in the) refusal rate on the (change in the) vacancy rate.
Second, the ﬁndings reported in Table A2.3 should generally be inter-
preted with caution. This is because both the commuting distance and
the price volatility are likely highly endogenous, as are the alternative
proxies for mismatch (some of them have the opposite sign from what
might have been expected). Hence, the reported coeﬃcients are likely
biased. Still, overall, we interpret the results reported in Table A2.3 as
indicating that the increased mismatch between the preferences of the
local residents and the characteristics of the available local housing
stock causally contributes to our key ﬁnding of a positive impact of
tighter local restrictiveness on local vacancy rates. This ﬁnding is cer-
tainly plausible in the context of the extraordinarily rigid British
planning system. Whether similar eﬀects can be observed in other
countries is an interesting question.
3.8. Sensitivity analysis
Finally, we conducted a set of robustness checks. We tested 1) the
sensitivity of our choice of polynomial in relation to changes in the
share of Labour votes; 2) the possible endogeneity of earnings; 3)
whether results are driven by idiosyncratic factors associated with the
Greater London Area; 4) whether the results are sensitive to including
all refusals of residential development, not just refusals of applications
for major developments; 5) whether a ﬁxed eﬀects approach rather than
ﬁrst diﬀerencing makes any diﬀerence to the main ﬁndings; and 6)
whether the change of the Census deﬁnition of vacancies in 2011 aﬀects
our ﬁndings. The main results survive all these tests and alternative
speciﬁcations essentially unchanged. The results are set out in detail in
Appendix 2.
4. Conclusions
This is the ﬁrst attempt to rigorously analyse the impact of land use
regulation on the spatial and temporal variation in housing vacancy
rates. It would come as no surprise to economists to observe that in
well-functioning Labour markets there was unemployment. Workers
search for jobs and employers seek (better) qualiﬁed workers.
Attempting to regulate unemployment away makes no sense. Vacant
23 We repeat the same analysis using a diversity measure based on the share of
dwellings of a certain type (ﬂats, terraced housing, semi-detached housing and detached
housing). However, those data are not available for 1981, so we do not include LA ﬁxed
eﬀects on top of ﬁrst-diﬀerencing the variables to avoid the issue that those absorb all
eﬀective variation. We again ﬁnd no eﬀect of regulation on housing diversity. The eﬀects
are wholly statistically insigniﬁcant and are quantitatively unimportant.
24 Our prior is that in Britain at least, tight local regulation should reduce the local
variation of house types. This is because historic preservation in British cities is wide-
spread and so called Conservation Areas ensure that all houses in a road look pretty much
the same, thus potentially reducing the variance in types. In addition regulation includes
prescriptions as to materials (most commonly matching local houses/traditions) and the
external appearance of buildings.
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houses are equivalent to unemployed workers yet, at least in Britain,
policy does try to ‘regulate’ vacant homes away by using their existence
to justify being more restrictive in the control of the supply of new
homes and the structural adaptation of existing ones.
In this paper we argue that such restrictions have two main op-
posing eﬀects on housing vacancies. The ‘opportunity cost eﬀect’ leads
to a lower vacancy rate in the more restrictive housing markets because
supply constraints lead to higher prices, and thus to higher opportunity
costs of keeping housing vacant. The ‘mismatch eﬀect’, however, im-
plies higher vacancy rates in the more restrictive housing markets be-
cause households will ﬁnd it more diﬃcult to match their preferences to
the characteristics of the local housing supply given their budget con-
straints. So search becomes more prolonged and costly and households
choose to search for properties further aﬁeld and commute longer.
We do indeed conﬁrm that there is a simple negative correlation
between local planning restrictiveness and local housing vacancies.
Superﬁcially this appears to support the planners' ‘common sense’ that
the existence of empty houses means they can – even should – plan to
be more restrictive in supply. This unconditional correlation, however,
is the result of a form of joint causation. When we eﬀectively control for
unobserved characteristics at the local level by using ﬁrst diﬀerencing,
the negative correlation turns positive. When we further control for
local linear trends, for other potential explanatory variables and ac-
count for the endogeneity of local regulatory restrictiveness, the causal
eﬀect of restrictiveness on vacancy rates is ﬁrmly positive, statistically
signiﬁcant and economically substantial.
Our empirical analysis does not fully unpack the box of explana-
tions. It is a reduced form telling us what the net impact of increased
planning restrictiveness is on housing vacancies. If an LA becomes more
restrictive, signalled by an increase in the rate of refusal of residential
development proposals, then all else equal, vacancy rates increase in
that LA. We also provide direct evidence that mismatch may be an
important reason for higher vacancy rates in more restrictive housing
markets: The more restrictive in planning terms a local jurisdiction is,
the longer is the average commuting distance of workers within it. We
subject these ﬁndings to an extensive range of sensitivity analyses. They
survive remarkably unaltered.
Welfare implications in markets with search frictions are not easy to
derive. This is because in such a second best world, households may
search less or more than would be welfare optimal (Koster and Van
Ommeren, 2017). This paper does not set out to assess the net welfare
impact of tightening the supply of housing. However, because reg-
ulatory constraints seem to worsen matching for households, the eﬀect
of tighter restrictions on vacancies and commute times unequivocally
generates a welfare cost.
It is the mismatch between the preferences of households and the
housing stock on oﬀer that leads, other things equal, to higher vacancy
rates in the more regulated – typically more desirable – places. This is
not to say that tighter regulatory constraints in some places necessarily
increase vacancy rates at the aggregate level (for the whole country).
However, even if on aggregate vacancy rates were unaﬀected by reg-
ulatory restrictiveness, such constraints will still likely cause a sig-
niﬁcant welfare loss. This is because too much housing stays empty in
the most regulated, most desirable and, by implication, most productive
places with the strongest demand and highest valuations for living
space. So people are induced to commute further, while living in the
“wrong” places.
There are important implications for policy, particularly for the UK
because of its extraordinarily restrictive planning system. Crucially
planners should not allocate less land for development on the grounds
that there are empty houses. Some vacancies are integral to the well-
functioning of any market and, as our results show, trying to ‘regulate
housing vacancies away’ is counterproductive. There is moreover a nice
irony for advocates of the ‘compact city’. The most common policy to
attempt to implement this ideal is to impose growth boundaries (make
land scarcer) and be more restrictive to adaptations of the existing stock
or – in the US – make it more diﬃcult to obtain zoning ordinance
waivers. In summary aiming for a compact city makes planning policy
more restrictive. Our results show this will have exactly the opposite to
the intended eﬀect because average commuting distances will lengthen
as residents search further aﬁeld for housing they can aﬀord and mat-
ches their preferences.
Appendix 1. Election data
The local election data are obtained from three diﬀerent sources. The ﬁrst source is the British Local Election Database, which is compiled by
Rallings and Thrasher (2004). They have combined diﬀerent data sources on local election outcomes from 1889 to 2003. From 1973, the data
contain the universe of local election outcomes. The data are available on a ward level and display for every election the number of candidates, the
number of votes per candidate and the number of vacant seats. Councillors that received the most votes will be elected. It is important to note that
the share of votes for each party is therefore not perfectly correlated to the assigned number of seats. Based on the number of votes, we determine
which candidate is elected as a councillor. The British Local Election Database only provides information on the election results, and not on the
current composition of the LA. The problem is that for many local authorities, there are yearly or two-yearly elections of which 33% of the seats are
replaced. To estimate the composition of the local council, we use the fact that the full electoral term for councillors is usually four years. However,
sometimes elections replace the complete council despite the fact that councillors did not complete the electoral term, for example due to changes in
boundaries of local authorities. To account for this, we consider full elections as elections where at least 75% of the seats are replaced.
The second data source for local election results is the local election handbooks from 1999 to 2008 (see Hilber et al., 2011). These data provide
the number of council seats for each local authority in each year. We measure the correlation of the shares of seats of diﬀerent parties (Labour,
Conservatives, Liberal Democrats, Other) between the British Local Election Database and the latter database for the overlapping years. This is
always above 0.95. For the overlapping years, we take the average of shares in seats in both datasets. For 2006–2011, we obtain information on
Labour votes (rather than seats) from the Local Elections Archive Project (LEAP). For 55 LAs, we do not have information available for the most
recent election in 2011. We then use information on Labour vote shares for the 2007 elections. We made sure that excluding these 55 LA lead to
essentially the same results. The ﬁnal dataset is from the BBC with the outcomes of local council elections for 2009, 2010 and 2011 to complement
the LEAP when necessary.
We also use outcomes of general elections to control for demographic changes and general trends in political preferences. We have data of
election results for 1983, 1987, 1991, 1997, 2001, 2005 and 2010 obtained from Electoral Calculus. We match each year to the previous election,
except for 1981, which is matched to 1983. The results are available at the parliamentary constituency level, which are almost always smaller than
LAs. Using geographical information systems, we calculate the geographical overlap of each constituency with each LA and assign the votes ac-
cordingly.
In Fig. 4 we provide a scatterplot of the share of Labour votes and the share of Labour seats from 1978 to 2011 for each year and local authority.
Not surprisingly there is a strong positive correlation between seats and votes. However, below a vote share of one third, votes translate into a less
than proportional number of seats (denoted by the dashed line). In a number of cases votes did not even translate into any seats at all. Furthermore,
because of the ‘ﬁrst-past-the-post feature of the system’, above a vote share of one third, votes lead to a more than proportional number of seats.
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When having> 70% of the votes usually implies that all seats are assigned to the Labour party.
Table A1.1 shows correlations for the election variables of the Labour party in our data: The correlation between the share of Labour council seats
and the share of Labour votes is high (0.87). The correlation with the general election vote share is somewhat lower, but still reasonable high (0.67).
If we look at the correlation between the changes, these are lower (respectively 0.57 and 0.48).
Table A1.1
Correlations between election variables.
Share Labour seats Share Labour votes Share Labour votes gen. elec.
Share Labour seats, t-2 1.0000
Share Labour votes 0.8761 1.0000
Share Labour votes general elections 0.6901 0.6060 1.0000
Δ Share Labour seats Δ Share Labour votes Δ Share Labour votes gen. elec.
Δ Share Labour seats, t-2 1.0000
Δ Share Labour votes 0.5706 1.0000
Δ Share Labour votes general elections 0.4474 0.3834 1.0000
Appendix 2. Sensitivity analysis
To begin with, we re-estimate the preferred speciﬁcation (column (7), Table 2), but include LA expenditure by category, one by one, as additional
controls (columns (1) to (5)). In column (6) we instead include total local expenditures as an additional control. We report the results for vacancy
rates in Table A2.1 below. The coeﬃcients unequivocally indicate that the impact of the refusal rate on vacancy rates is unaﬀected, even when we
control for total local expenditures or for each category of expenditure individually. Planning expenses seem to have some direct negative impact on
vacancy rates (column (5)), so more planning expenses lead to lower vacancy rates. In column (6) we show that, even when the share of Labour seats
might have a positive eﬀect on total local expenditures (see Table 5), it seems that local expenditures do not have a direct impact on vacancy rates.
Hence, this provides additional evidence that the exclusion restriction holds.
We also do a similar exercise but take the change in the log of commuting time as dependent variable. The results reported in Table A2.2 suggest
that the eﬀect of regulation on commuting distances cannot be explained by diﬀerences in expenditures on education, social services, highways, or
planning. Column (4) shows that when controlling for housing expenditures the eﬀect of regulation becomes statistically insigniﬁcant (p-
value = 0.222). We do, however, not worry too much because the impact of housing expenditures is highly insigniﬁcant and the point estimate is
very similar to the baseline estimate. On the other hand, column (6) suggests that the eﬀect of commuting is even somewhat stronger, despite the
eﬀect that the total LA expenditures have a positive and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on commuting distance.
Next, we include commuting distance, price volatility and room diversity as additional controls in the regression of vacancy rates on the refusal
rate. Table A2.3 reports the results, where column (7) in Table 2 is the corresponding speciﬁcation. In column (1) of Table A2.3 we show that
commuting distance is positively associated with higher vacancy rates. A one kilometre increase in the average commuting distance is associated
with an increase in the vacancy rate of about 2 percentage points. We do not interpret this as a strictly causal eﬀect, but the sign is in line with our
expectations. The eﬀect of restrictiveness is about 15% lower compared to the baseline speciﬁcation. The eﬀect is now statistically signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero only at the 13% level (p-value = 0.131). Commuting distance is a crude proxy for mismatch in the housing market, which may
explain why the eﬀect of interest is only somewhat smaller. In column (2) we include the coeﬃcient of variation of prices in the year of observation
and the three years subsequent to the year of observation. The coeﬃcient is positive and highly statistically signiﬁcant. Interestingly, the coeﬃcient
on regulatory restrictiveness is now somewhat higher compared to the baseline speciﬁcation. Column (3) investigates the eﬀect of regulation on
vacancy rates again, while controlling for room diversity. The eﬀect of the refusal rate becomes somewhat stronger, although it is close to the
baseline speciﬁcation. Room diversity is, as expected, positively correlated to vacancy rates. In column (4), Table A2.3, we control for all variables,
including the change in the share of crowded properties, the share of non-permanent homes and the share migrants. The coeﬃcient related to the
refusal rate is very similar to the previous speciﬁcations.
Recall that in our preferred speciﬁcation (column (7) of Table 2), we included a ﬁfth-order polynomial of changes in the share Labour votes in
each LA. This is to isolate the impact of potentially unobserved demographic and socio-economic variables, which may be reﬂected in voting
behaviour, from local political power. However, the choice of the order of polynomial is somewhat arbitrary. Table A2.4 investigates the robustness
of the results to this choice. Panel A reports second-stage results, whereas Panel B reports the corresponding ﬁrst-stage results. In column (1) of Panel
A we include only a linear term of change in the share Labour votes in local elections as a control. Changes in the share of Labour votes do not have a
direct eﬀect on changes in vacancy rates. The coeﬃcient on the change in the refusal rate variable is statistically signiﬁcant at the 11% level. When
we include a third or fourth-order polynomial of change in share Labour votes, the coeﬃcient on the change in the refusal rate variable becomes
slightly higher and statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level. In column (5) we include a ﬁfth-order polynomial of the change in local Labour vote
shares, but we also include a ﬁfth-order polynomial of the change in general election vote shares. The latter might be relevant, as one could argue
that results of general elections might be a better proxy for the demographic characteristics of an LA, due to the substantially higher turnouts; on the
other hand re-working the Parliamentary Constituency vote shares to generate an estimate for LAs must induce some measurement error. The point
estimate is very similar to the preferred speciﬁcation, but the eﬀect is only statistically signiﬁcant at the 20% level, likely due to a weaker ﬁrst-stage
(the corresponding ﬁrst-stage Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic is only 4.9). In Panel B, we report corresponding ﬁrst-stage estimates. The instrument has a
similar impact across diﬀerent speciﬁcations, but becomes somewhat smaller in magnitude, once we allow for more ﬂexibility in the vote share
controls.
In the baseline results we only treat changes in the refusal rate as endogenous. It is possible to argue that changes in earnings are also subject to
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endogeneity concerns. Earnings, which are a proxy for local demand for housing, are also dependent on the reaction of Labour supply to changes in
demand. In turn, local Labour supply depends on the ﬂexibility and adaptability of the housing stock to accommodate new workers, and may
therefore depend on the vacancy rate as well (Glaeser et al., 2006; Saks, 2008; Hilber and Vermeulen, 2016). We therefore use a ‘Bartik instrument’
(Bartik, 1991) based on employment by industry in 1971 to identify earnings. The shock predicts the level of employment in each LA using
information on national employment growth in each industry. So, we use exogenous changes (from the local perspective) in employment growth to
predict total employment in each LA in each year. Table A2.5 reports the results. Panel A reports second-stage results, while Panels B and C report the
corresponding ﬁrst-stage results. In column (1) of Panel A we only include the endogenous variables change in refusal rate and change in earnings
plus the year ﬁxed eﬀects. Changes in regulatory restrictiveness are still strongly positively correlated with changes in vacancy rates. The eﬀect of
changes in earnings is statistically insigniﬁcant, in line with previous results. Column (2) additionally includes LA ﬁxed eﬀects. The Kleibergen-Paap
F-statistic of 5.5 now indicates fairly weak identiﬁcation. Since our model is just identiﬁed, the estimated instrumented coeﬃcients are median
unbiased, yet they may be too imprecisely estimated to be useful (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). Moreover, if our results are biased, they should be
biased towards the corresponding OLS estimates (see columns (2) and (3) Table 2), which in our case would imply that the estimated coeﬃcients are
themselves underestimates (Stock and Yogo, 2005; Murray, 2006). In any case with these caveats in mind, column (2) indicates that changes in the
regulatory restrictiveness have a positive and statistically signiﬁcant impact on changes in vacancy rates. Although the coeﬃcient on the change in
earnings variable now becomes positive and is much larger in magnitude than in previous speciﬁcations, it is not statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero. When we include further control variables in column (3), the results are hardly aﬀected (and coeﬃcients remain weakly identiﬁed). In the
ﬁnal – most rigorous – speciﬁcation, reported in column (4), we also control ﬂexibly for vote shares. The refusal rate has a positive and statistically
signiﬁcant impact (at the 5% level) on vacancy rates: a one standard deviation increase in the refusal rate increases the vacancy rate by 1.1
percentage points, very similar to that implied by the estimates reported in Table 2.
In Panels B and Panel C we report the corresponding ﬁrst-stage estimates of the models for the change in the refusal rate and the change in
earnings respectively. Changes in the share of Labour seats are a reasonably strong instrument for the change in the refusal rate. Changes in the
Labour demand shock measure are strongly positively correlated to changes in the refusal rate (i.e. areas that have experienced an exogenous inﬂow
of employment have also become substantially more restrictive). In Panel C, Table A2.5, we observe that changes in the Labour demand shock
measure are also positively correlated to changes in earnings, as anticipated.
We consider a number of additional sensitivity checks. The results are reported in Table A2.6. First, we exclude the Greater London Area to test
whether the results are driven by the restrictive metropolitan area of London. Column (1) in Table A2.6 shows that the coeﬃcient related to
restrictions is even somewhat stronger compared to the baseline speciﬁcation in column (7), Table 2. Hence, our results are not driven by the Greater
London area. In column (2), Table A2.6, we focus on all restrictions as a sensitivity check. Because minor applications are much less important than
major applications; the latter referring to the construction of at least 10 dwellings, while the ﬁrst may refer to an application to construct an attic. We
therefore, somewhat arbitrarily, ﬁrst calculate the major and minor refusal rate and then take the average to arrive at the total refusal rate. The
results indicate that the coeﬃcient related to the total refusal rate is somewhat higher, albeit similar to the baseline speciﬁcation. Because the refusal
rate for minor projects is much noisier than the refusal rate for major projects, the Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic is much lower than in the baseline
speciﬁcation. This translates into somewhat less precise second-stage estimates, although the eﬀect is still statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero at the 10% level.
Finally, we pursue a ﬁxed eﬀects approach, rather than ﬁrst-diﬀerencing. In column (3) we regress the vacancy rate on the refusal rate, while
controlling for demographic variables, all in levels. We also include LA ﬁxed eﬀects. The results indicate then that a one standard deviation increase
in the refusal rate leads to an increase in the vacancy rate of 0.76 percentage points, which is similar to the baseline speciﬁcation. In column (4) we
include 354 LA-speciﬁc linear trends. Results are essentially unchanged. Column (5) includes non-linear trends by estimating second-order poly-
nomials. The eﬀect almost doubles to 1.82, but that may be due to weaker identiﬁcation (the Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic is relatively low with 5.1).
Nevertheless, this suggests that controlling more carefully for unobserved time-varying factors of locations, the eﬀect of restrictions on vacancy rates
does not disappear.
The last concern we address is that the data on vacant housing may be measured with error, because in 2011 the Census also included second
homes. We therefore use another data source for 2001 and 2011 from the Department of Communities and Local Government (DCLG - only available
for a shorter time period). Because we do not have clear priors which data source provides a better estimate of ‘real’ vacancies in 2001, we calculate
the average vacancy rate using both data sources for the year. We then estimate the same models as in Table 2. The second-stage results are reported
in Table A2.7. Column (1) shows that even the bivariate speciﬁcation suggests a positive and signiﬁcant correlation between changes in regulatory
restrictiveness and changes in vacancy rates. This also holds if we include LA ﬁxed eﬀects in column (2) and control variables in column (3). In
column (4), we instrument the change in refusal rate with the change in share of Labour seats. The coeﬃcient is almost identical to previous results: a
one standard deviation increase in the refusal rate increases the vacancy rate by 1.0 percentage points. This result is hardly aﬀected if we include LA
ﬁxed eﬀects in column (5) and control variables in column (6). In column (7), we ﬁnally control ﬂexibly for the change in local vote shares. In the last
speciﬁcation the coeﬃcient on the change in the refusal rate variable becomes slightly but not statistically signiﬁcantly smaller. It is still statistically
signiﬁcant at the 10% level. Note that the ﬁrst-stage estimates are identical to the ones presented in Table 3. The results seem highly reassuring and
strongly indicate that the potential measurement error in the Census data is not inﬂuencing our results.
In Table A2.8 we further test the robustness of our results to the potential measurement problem by excluding 2011 from the analysis. We report
OLS and second stage results in Panel A. In columns (1) to (3), where we do not address endogeneity concerns, changes in the refusal rate are
positively associated with changes in the vacancy rate, although the eﬀect is not statistically signiﬁcant in column (3). In column (4), we instrument
for the change in the refusal rate. Again, the coeﬃcient is strongly positive, but quite imprecisely estimated. The same holds for the remaining
models; due to weak identiﬁcation (see Panel B), the estimated eﬀects are rather imprecisely estimated. Nevertheless, they seem to point towards a
positive and economically meaningful eﬀect of regulatory restrictiveness on vacancy rates, in line with the previous results.
To conclude, the various robustness checks all deliver very similar estimated eﬀects of restrictiveness on vacancy rates in terms of magnitude
compared to the baseline models. This provides additional support for the proposition that increased regulatory restrictiveness causes mismatch,
leading to higher vacancy rates and longer commutes. We note that the results are not always statistically strong in the more comprehensive
speciﬁcations. This appears to be mainly due to weak(er) identiﬁcation.
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Table A2.1
Controlling for expenditures – second stage. (Dependent variable: Δ vacancy rate).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Δ Refusal rate, t-2 0.888* 0.915* 0.930* 0.841+ 0.797+ 0.954*
(0.522) (0.520) (0.528) (0.551) (0.497) (0.569)
Δ Education expenditures (log) −0.0781
(0.106)
Δ Social services expenditures (log) −0.491
(0.435)
Δ Highway expenditures (log) 0.0503
(0.254)
Δ Housing expenditures (log) −0.00581
(0.0598)
Δ Planning expenditures (log) −0.126+
(0.0856)
Δ Total local expenditures (log) 0.179
(0.143)
Year ﬁxed eﬀects (3) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Local authority ﬁxed eﬀects (350) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control variables (8) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Δ Share Labour voters local elections Ω(∙) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1050 1050 1047 998 1015 1050
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 8.265 8.400 8.314 7.543 8.835 7.471
Notes: All independent variables (except for earnings) are standardised with mean zero and unit standard deviation. Bold indicates instrumented. The instrument for Δ Refusal rate is Δ
Share of Labour seats in the LA. Ω(∙) is approximated by a ﬁfth-order polynomial of share Labour voters in local elections. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the LA level. ***
p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10, + p < 0.15.
Table A2.2
Controlling for expenditures – second stage. (Dependent variable: Δ commuting distance from workplace (log)).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Δ Refusal rate, t-2 0.0600+ 0.0605+ 0.0588+ 0.0474 0.0568+ 0.0731*
(0.0402) (0.0399) (0.0403) (0.0388) (0.0379) (0.0437)
Δ Education expenditures (log) −0.00928
(0.00818)
Δ Social services expenditures (log) 0.00778
(0.0358)
Δ Highway expenditures (log) −0.0169
(0.0160)
Δ Housing expenditures (log) 0.000828
(0.00442)
Δ Planning expenditures (log) −0.000148
(0.00594)
Δ Total local expenditures (log) 0.0373***
(0.0114)
Year ﬁxed eﬀects (3) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Local authority ﬁxed eﬀects (350) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control variables (8) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Δ Share Labour voters local elections Ω(∙) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1050 1050 1047 998 1015 1050
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 8.265 8.400 8.314 7.543 8.835 7.471
Notes: All independent variables (except for earnings) are standardised with mean zero and unit standard deviation. Bold indicates instrumented. The instrument for Δ Refusal rate is Δ
Share of Labour seats in the LA. Ω(∙) is approximated by a ﬁfth-order polynomial of share Labour voters in local elections. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the LA level. ***
p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10, + p < 0.15.
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Table A2.3
Results controlling for commuting time and house price volatility.
Panel A – second stage (1) (2) (3) (4)
(Dependent variable: Δ vacancy rate) 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Δ Refusal rate, t-2 0.775+ 1.051** 0.867* 1.030*
(0.513) (0.517) (0.510) (0.543)
Δ Commuting distance from workplace (log) 1.977*** 1.798***
(0.660) (0.685)
Δ Coeﬃcient of variation of house prices, t + 3 2.969** 2.484**
(1.173) (1.128)
Δ Room diversity 0.651*** 0.640***
(0.192) (0.227)
Δ Share crowded properties −0.594**
(0.281)
Δ Share non-permanent properties 0.292+
(0.192)
Δ Share migrants 0.115
(0.107)
Year ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Local authority ﬁxed eﬀects (350) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control variables included (8) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Δ Share Labour voters local elections Ω(∙) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1050 1050 1050 1050
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 8.307 9.052 8.154 8.106
Panel B – ﬁrst stage
(Dependent variable: Δ refusal rate, t-2)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS OLS OLS
Δ Share Labour seats, t-2 −0.267** −0.278** −0.265** −0.266**
(0.114) (0.113) (0.114) (0.115)
Δ Commuting distance from workplace (log) −0.148 −0.0883
(0.484) (0.492)
Δ Coeﬃcient of variation of house prices, t + 3 0.962 1.044
(0.879) (0.914)
Δ Room diversity −0.0430 −0.148
(0.171) (0.176)
Δ Share crowded properties 0.232
(0.206)
Δ Share non-permanent properties 0.0410
(0.110)
Δ Share migrants 0.0778
(0.0946)
Year ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Local authority ﬁxed eﬀects (350) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control variables included (8) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Δ Share Labour voters local elections Ω(∙) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1050 1050 1050 1050
R-squared 0.331 0.333 0.331 0.337
Notes: All independent variables (except for commuting time and house price variation) are standardised with mean zero and unit standard deviation. Bold indicates instrumented. The
instrument for Δ Refusal rate is Δ Share of Labour seats. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the LA level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10, + < 0.15.
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Table A2.4
Controlling for vote shares.
Panel A – second stage
(Dependent variable: Δ vacancy rate)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Δ Refusal rate, t-2 0.756+ 0.782+ 0.861* 0.897* 0.888
(0.473) (0.490) (0.505) (0.526) (0.689)
Year ﬁxed eﬀects (3) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Local authority ﬁxed eﬀects (350) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control variables included (8) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Δ Share Labour votes local elections −0.0742 2nd order 3rd order 4rd order 5th order
(0.158) Polynomial Polynomial Polynomial Polynomial
Δ Share Labour voters general elections No No No No 5th order polynomial
Observations 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 9.213 8.896 8.680 8.285 4.917
Panel B – ﬁrst stage
(Dependent variable: Δ refusal rate, t-2)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Δ Share Labour seats, t-2 −0.274** −0.271** −0.273** −0.267** −0.215*
(0.111) (0.112) (0.114) (0.114) (0.119)
Year ﬁxed eﬀects (3) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Local authority ﬁxed eﬀects (350) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control variables included (8) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Δ Share Labour votes local elections −0.174* 2nd order 3rd order 4rd order 5th order
(0.101) Polynomial Polynomial Polynomial Polynomial
Δ Share Labour voters general elections No No No No 5th order polynomial
Observations 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050
R-squared 0.329 0.329 0.329 0.331 0.338
Notes: All independent variables (except for earnings) are standardised with mean zero and unit standard deviation. Bold indicates instrumented. The instrument for Δ Refusal rate, t-2 is
Δ Share Labour seats, t-2. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the LA level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10, + p < 0.15.
Table A2.5
Instrumenting for regulatory restrictiveness and earnings.
Panel A – second stage
(Dependent variable: Δ vacancy rate)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Δ Refusal rate, t-2 0.814** 0.966** 0.816* 1.055**
(0.390) (0.387) (0.439) (0.498)
Δ Earnings (log) −0.257 4.469 6.370 4.149
(1.717) (5.170) (5.820) (5.114)
Year ﬁxed eﬀects (3) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Local authority ﬁxed eﬀects (350) No Yes Yes Yes
Control variables included (8) No No Yes Yes
Δ Share Labour voters local elections Ω(∙) No No No Yes
Observations 1050 1050 1050 1050
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 9.660 5.467 3.714 3.610
Panel B – ﬁrst stage
(Dependent variable: Δ refusal rate, t-2)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS OLS OLS
Δ Share Labour seats, t-2 −0.305*** −0.297*** −0.312*** −0.224*
(0.0702) (0.0957) (0.0981) (0.116)
Δ Labour demand shock 1971 (log) 2.121*** 6.953** 10.29*** 10.12***
(0.666) (2.843) (3.102) (3.159)
Year ﬁxed eﬀects (3) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Local authority ﬁxed eﬀects (350) No Yes Yes Yes
Control variables included (8) No No Yes Yes
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Δ Share Labour voters local elections Ω(∙) No No No Yes
Observations 1050 1050 1050 1050
Adj. R-squared 0.172 0.317 0.335 0.342
Angrist-Pischke F-statistic 14.12 14.17 19.00 12.24
Panel C – ﬁrst stage
(Dependent variable: Δ earnings (log))
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS OLS OLS
Δ Share Labour seats, t-2 0.00575 0.0119 0.00259 0.0140
(0.00864) (0.0117) (0.0106) (0.0124)
Δ Labour demand shock 1971 (log) 0.823*** 1.011*** 1.245*** 1.267***
(0.0809) (0.283) (0.326) (0.339)
Year ﬁxed eﬀects (3) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Local authority ﬁxed eﬀects (350) No Yes Yes Yes
Control variables included (8) No No Yes Yes
Δ Share Labour voters local elections Ω(∙) No No No Yes
Observations 1050 1050 1050 1050
R-squared 0.406 0.557 0.616 0.622
Angrist-Pischke F-statistic 51.73 9.56 11.30 10.67
Notes: Bold indicates instrumented. The instruments for Δ Refusal rate and Δ Earnings (log) are Δ Share of Labour seats and Δ Labour demand shock 1971 (log). Standard errors in
parentheses are clustered at the LA level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10, + p < 0.15.
Table A2.6
Additional sensitivity checks – second stage results.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Exclude Greater
London
Refusal rate for
all projects
Fixed eﬀects approach
– no trends
Fixed eﬀects approach –
linear trends
Fixed eﬀects approach –
non-linear trends
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Δ Refusal rate, t-2 1.218**
(0.511)
Δ Refusal rate for all
projects, t-2
1.124*
(0.673)
Refusal rate, t-2 0.757** 0.714** 1.822***
(0.346) (0.294) (0.690)
Control variables included
(8)
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Δ Share Labour voters
local elections Ω(∙)
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Share Labour voters local
elections Ω(∙)
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Local authority ﬁxed
eﬀects (350)
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Local authority linear
trends (350)
No No No Yes Yes
Local authority non-linear
trends (350)
No No No No Yes
Year ﬁxed eﬀects (3) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 954 1050 1400 1400 1400
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 9.608 2.962 17.52 16.63 5.081
Notes: All independent variables (except for earnings) are standardised with mean zero and unit standard deviation. Bold indicates instrumented. The instrument for (Δ) Refusal rate is
(Δ) Share of Labour seats in the LA. Ω(∙) is approximated by a ﬁfth-order polynomial of share Labour voters. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the LA level. *** p < 0.01, **
p < 0.05, * p < 0.10, + p < 0.15.
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Table A2.7
Results using census data (1981–2001) and DCLG data (2001−2011). (Dependent variable: Δ vacancy rate).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Δ Refusal rate, t-2 0.100*** 0.141*** 0.115** 0.961*** 1.040*** 0.917*** 0.780*
(0.0375) (0.0502) (0.0472) (0.350) (0.348) (0.308) (0.429)
Year ﬁxed eﬀects (3) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Local authority ﬁxed eﬀects (350) No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Control variables included (8) No No Yes No No Yes Yes
Δ Share Labour voters local elections Ω(∙) No No No No No No Yes
Observations 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050
R-squared 0.294 0.468 0.522
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 18.56 17.61 19.09 8.212
Notes: All independent variables (except for earnings) are standardised with mean zero and unit standard deviation. Bold indicates instrumented. In Models (4)–(7), the instrument for Δ
Refusal rate is Δ Share of Labour seats in the LA. Ω(∙) is approximated by a ﬁfth-order polynomial of share Labour voters in local elections. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at
the LA level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10, + p < 0.15.
Table A2.8
Results using census data (1981–2001, excluding 2011).
Panel A – second stage
(Dependent variable: Δ vacancy rate)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Δ Refusal rate, t-2 0.123** 0.191** 0.114 1.121 2.483* 2.321* 2.844
(0.0490) (0.0896) (0.0702) (0.697) (1.278) (1.401) (2.467)
Year ﬁxed eﬀects (2) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Local authority ﬁxed eﬀects (350) No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Control variables included (8) No No Yes No No Yes Yes
Δ Share Labour voters local elections Ω(∙) No No No No No No Yes
Observations 700 700 700 700 700 700 700
R-squared 0.412 0.620 0.736
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 7.528 4.365 2.939 1.355
PANEL B – First stage (4) (5) (6) (7)
(Dependent variable: Δ Refusal rate, t-2) OLS OLS OLS OLS
Δ Share Labour seats, t-2 −0.243*** −0.255 −0.219 −0.163
(0.0886) (0.173) (0.182) (0.200)
Year ﬁxed eﬀects (2) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Local authority ﬁxed eﬀects (350) No Yes Yes Yes
Control variables included (8) No No Yes Yes
Δ Share Labour voters local elections Ω(∙) No No No Yes
Observations 700 700 700 700
R-squared 0.070 0.358 0.375 0.385
Notes: All independent variables (except for earnings) are standardised with mean zero and unit standard deviation. Bold indicates instrumented. In Models (4)–(7), the instrument for Δ
Refusal rate is Δ Share of Labour seats in the LA. Ω(∙) is approximated by a ﬁfth-order polynomial of share Labour voters in local elections. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at
the LA level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10, + p < 0.15.
Appendix 3. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.12.006.
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